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Abstract
How is long run economic growth related to the diversity of knowledge? We
formulate and study a microeconomic model of knowledge creation, through the in-
teractions among a group of R & D workers, embedded in a growth model to address
this question. Income to these workers accrues as patent income, whereas transmis-
sion of newly created knowledge to all such workers occurs due to public transmission
of patent information. Our model incorporates two key aspects of the cooperative
process of knowledge creation: (i) heterogeneity of people in their state of knowledge
is essential for successful cooperation in the joint creation of new ideas, while (ii) the
very process of cooperative knowledge creation a¤ects the heterogeneity of people
through the accumulation of knowledge in common. The model features myopic
R & D workers in a pure externality model of interaction. Surprisingly, in the
general case for a large set of initial conditions we nd that the equilibrium process
of knowledge creation converges to the most productive state, where the population
splits into smaller groups of optimal size; close interaction takes place within each
group only. Equilibrium paths are found analytically. Long run economic growth is
positively related to both the e¤ectiveness of pairwise R & D worker interaction and
to the e¤ectiveness of public knowledge transmission. JEL Classication Numbers:
D83, O31, D90 Keywords: knowledge creation, knowledge externalities, microfoun-
dations of endogenous growth, knowledge diversity and growth
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1 Introduction
How is economic growth related to the diversity of knowledge? How does
knowledge diversity change as an economy grows? Can more e¤ective public
knowledge transmission, via the patenting process or the internet, cause the
knowledge base to become too homogeneous and slow growth? Given spillovers
in the creation of new knowledge, is the equilibrium knowledge production path
e¢ cient?
To address these questions, we attempt to provide microfoundations for
aggregate models of knowledge creation and transfer. The basic framework
that employs knowledge creation as a black box driving economic growth is
usually called the endogenous growth model. Here we make a modest attempt
to open that black box. The literature using this black box includes Shell
(1966), Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988), Jones and Manuelli (1990), and
many papers building on these contributions.1
In particular, the model proposed below is closely related to the endogenous
growth model developed by Romer (1990) in which R&Drms invest resources
to develop new products. In Romers model, the productivity of each R & D
rm rises in proportion to the stock of general knowledge capital; the latter
is assumed to be equal to the cumulative number of products invented in the
R & D sector in the past. In addition, all workers in the R & D sector are
assumed to be homogeneous. Hence, in Romers model, when labor is the
unique input in the R & D sector, the number of new products developed per
unit of time is also proportional to the number of R & D workers at that time.
While maintaining the assumption of monopolistic competition in the sec-
tor that produces horizontally di¤erentiated consumption goods, this paper
introduces several innovative features into the details of the R & D sector.
First, at any given time, all knowledge workers (K-workers) engaged in R & D
are heterogeneous in the sense that for any pair of K-workers, each has knowl-
edge distinct from the other as well as a stock of knowledge in common. Such
heterogeneity in K-workers provides them with an opportunity to cooperate
in R & D work. Second, the heterogeneity is endogenous to the model. At
each moment of time, each K-worker will want to conduct research with their
best partner (or partners); the new knowledge jointly created becomes shared
1We note that di¤erentiation of agents in terms of quality (or vertical characteristics) of
knowledge is studied in Jovanovic and Rob (1989) in the context of a search model. In
contrast, our model examines (endogenous) horizontal heterogeneity of agents and its e¤ect
on knowledge creation and consumption.
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knowledge, thus dynamically building up knowledge in common. When peo-
ple are not meeting, their knowledge bases grow more di¤erent. Thus, the
history of meetings and their content is important. Moreover, some of the
new knowledge created by any K-worker, either alone or in partnership with
others, is revealed in the form of patent registration and thus learned by all
K-workers, yielding additional knowledge in common. In this way, the hetero-
geneity or diversity of all K-workers changes endogenously over time. Third,
the e¤ectiveness of cooperation between K-workers can change over time, and
this change is endogenous. If two K-workers have too much knowledge in
common, little synergy can be expected from their joint work, since neither
brings originality to the partnership. Analogously, if two K-workers have
very di¤erent knowledge bases, they have little common ground for communi-
cation, so their partnership will not be very productive. Thus, a partnership
in knowledge creation is most productive when common and di¤erential knowl-
edge are in balance. Then, since the heterogeneity among K-workers changes
endogenously over time, the e¤ectiveness of cooperation amongK-workers also
changes endogenously.
We model endogenous agent heterogeneity, or horizontal agent di¤eren-
tiation, in order to look at the permanent e¤ects of knowledge creation on
growth.2 For simplicity, we assume that it is not possible for more than two
knowledge creators to meet or work at one time, though more than one couple
can work simultaneously. When agents meet, they create new, shared knowl-
edge, thus building up knowledge in common. When agents are not meeting
with each other, their knowledge bases grow more di¤erent. The fastest rate
of knowledge creation occurs when common and di¤erential knowledge are in
balance. The knowledge creation workers can work alone or with a partner.
The suitability of partners depends on the stock of knowledge they have in
common and their respective stocks of exclusive knowledge at a given time.
In order to provide microfoundations for behavior in the R & D sector, the
model of knowledge production detailed in Berliant and Fujita (forthcoming)
is embedded, with an extension to allow public knowledge transmission via
the patenting process, in a growth model. A manufacturing sector produces
consumption goods for both their workers and the knowledge workers, using a
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition framework. To produce a
consumption commodity under constant returns to manufacturing labor input,
2We employ a deterministic framework. It seems possible to add stochastic elements to
the model, but at the cost of complexity. It should also be possible to apply the law of large
numbers to a more basic stochastic framework to obtain equivalent results.
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a patent must be purchased from the R & D sector. Manufacturing work-
ers, rms, and consumers in the R & D sector are all farsighted, in the sense
that they have rational expectations about prices. The knowledge workers
themselves are myopic in their choices concerning R & D partnerships. This
simplifying assumption reduces the computational burden for both the knowl-
edge workers and us; surprisingly, our equilibrium performs well in e¢ ciency
tests.
For simplicity, we deal exclusively with the case when the agents are sym-
metric. Our model is analytically tractable, so we do not have to resort to
simulations; we nd each equilibrium path explicitly.
Our results are summarized as follows. When the initial state features
relative homogeneity of knowledge between knowledge workers, the sink will
be the most productive state, where the population splits into smaller groups
of optimal size; close interaction takes place within each group only.3 This
optimal size is larger as the heterogeneity of knowledge is more important in
the knowledge production process and as the transmission of public knowledge
becomes more e¤ective. The long run e¢ ciency result for the R & D sector is
the most surprising to us, as we posit a model with myopic knowledge workers
and with only externalities in interactions between knowledge workers, so one
would not expect e¢ cient outcomes.
Long run economic growth is positively related to both the e¤ectiveness
of pairwise knowledge worker interaction and, more importantly, to the e¤ec-
tiveness of public knowledge transmission. The latter is due, in part, to the
endogenous adjustment of group size to a better public knowledge transmis-
sion technology. Finally, if we dene e¢ ciency constrained by the monopo-
listic competition environment for consumption goods, for a su¢ ciently large
number of knowledge workers our equilibrium paths are nearly constrained
e¢ cient.
The model is also at an intermediate level of aggregation. That is, al-
though it is at a more micro level than large aggregate models such as those
found in the endogenous growth literature, we do not work out completely its
microfoundations. That is left to future research.
Section 2 gives the model and notation, Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium
path of dynamics in the knowledge production sector, Section 4 analyzes the
equilibrium growth path for the entire economy, whereas Section 5 explores the
e¢ ciency properties of the equilibrium path. Section 6 gives our conclusions
3It would be reasonable to call these groups R & D teams.
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and suggestions for future knowledge workers. Two appendices provide the
proofs of key results.
2 The Model
In this section, we introduce the basic model. There are three types of ac-
tivity in the economy. There are consumers of physical goods, producers of
physical goods, and the R & D sector. The activities in the economy repre-
senting physical commodity production and consumption are standard models
of product variety with monopolistic competition. The major di¤erence be-
tween our model and others is the level of detail in the R & D sector, that
generates patents sold to the producers of physical, di¤erentiated products.
We shall describe rst the consumer side of the economy, namely a market for
di¤erentiated products. In the following subsection, we describe the produc-
tion side of this market. Finally, we describe the R & D sector, the focus of
our work.
To begin, there are two types of workers: knowledge workers (K-workers)
engaged in R & D, and manufacturing workers (M -workers) producing di¤er-
entiated products. For simplicity, we assume that the type of each worker
is exogenously given, so workers cannot change sectors. Let N denote the
number of K-workers, and let L denote the number of M -workers.
Before getting into the details of the model, it is useful to discuss the
rationality assumptions we make regarding the agents. For the producers and
the manufacturing workers, we assume that they all have perfect foresight,
including knowledge of future prices. When knowledge workers consume,
they also have perfect foresight.
The important assumption concerns knowledge workers when they make
decisions about knowledge production, in particular which partner to work
with at any given time or whether to work alone. In our previous work,
we have used a myopic core solution concept. That is, workers in the R &
D sector make decisions about their research teams in a cooperative manner
but without looking ahead at the long term consequences. Such a concept
will be used below. The resulting time-varying pattern of knowledge creation
will be found explicitly; the path is both undominated and weakly overtakes
any other path. But we also show in Section 5 (under some restrictions)
that the myopic core solution is nearly optimal4 if a utilitarian social welfare
4Namely, for every  > 0, if N is su¢ ciently large, then the equilibrium path is within 
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function is used under perfect foresight. Thus, the solution path we propose
for a large set of parameters and initial conditions is at the intersection of
many solution concepts, and is nearly e¢ cient for the R & D sector (nearly
constrained e¢ cient in the entire economy).
In our view, this result is strongest when considering the myopic core solu-
tion concept, since in that case we have postulated a model with externalities
and R & D workers who are myopic, but attain a nearly constrained e¢ cient
outcome in spite of this.
2.1 Consumers
First, we describe consumerspreferences (the time argument is suppressed
when no confusion arises). All workers have the same instantaneous utility
function given by
u =
Z M
0
q(h) dh
1=
0 <  < 1 (1)
In this expression, M is the total mass of varieties available in the economy at
a given time, whereas q(h) represents the consumption of variety h 2 [0;M ].
If E denotes the expenditure of a consumer at a given time while p(h) is
the price of variety h, then the demand function is as follows:
q(h) = Ep(h) P  1 h 2 [0;M ] (2)
where   1=(1  ) represents the elasticity of substitution between any two
varieties, and P is the price index of varieties given by
P 
Z M
0
p(h) ( 1)dh
 1=( 1)
(3)
Introducing (3) and (2) into (1) yields the indirect utility function
v = E=P
We now describe the behavior of an arbitrary consumer i, who is either
a K-worker or an M -worker. If this consumer chooses an expenditure path,
Ei(t) for t 2 [0;1) such that Ei(t)  0, then his indirect utility at time t is
given by
vi(t) = Ei(t)=P (t) (4)
of the maximal welfare achievable by any feasible path of knowledge creation.
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where P (t) is the price index of the manufactured goods at time t.
The lifetime utility of consumer i at time 0 is then dened by
Ui(0) 
Z 1
0
e t ln[vi(t)]dt (5)
where  > 0 is the subjective discount rate common to all consumers.
The intertemporal allocation of resources is governed by an interest rate
equal to  (t) at time t. We must now specify consumer is intertemporal
budget constraint, that is, the present value of expenditure equals wealth. Let
yi(t) be the income that this consumer receives at time t. For any M -worker,
their income at time t will be their wage at that time, whereas for any K-
worker, their income at time t will be the value of the patents they create at
that time. Then, the present value of income is given by
Wi(0) =
Z 1
0
e 
 
 (t)tyi(t)dt (6)
where (t)  (1=t) R t
0
 () d is the average interest rate between 0 and t; in
(6), the term exp[ (t)] converts one unit of income at time t to an equivalent
unit at time 0. Using the budget ow constraint, Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995, p. 66) show that the consumers intertemporal budget constraint may
be written as follows: Z 1
0
Ei(t)e
 (t)tdt = !i +Wi(0) (7)
where !i is the value of the consumers initial assets, specied as follows:
!i = 0 for M -worker i
and
!i =
(0) M(0)
N
for K-worker i (8)
So each K-worker owns the same number M(0)
N
of patents at time 0, where the
price of patents at time 0 is (0).
Then, if Ei() stands for an expenditure path that maximizes (5) subject
to (7), the rst order condition implies that

Ei(t)=Ei(t) =  (t)   t  0 (9)
where

Ei(t)  dEi(t)=dt. Since (9) must hold for every consumer, it is clear
that the following relation must hold
7

E(t)=E(t) = (t)   t  0 (10)
where E(t) stands for the total expenditure in the economy at time t.
2.2 Producers
We now turn to the production side of the economy. We normalize the wage
rate of manufacturing workers to 1:
wM = 1 t  0 (11)
The production of any variety, say h, requires the use of the patent specic
to this variety, which has been developed in the R & D sector. Once a rm has
acquired the patent at the market price (which corresponds to this rms xed
cost), it can produce one unit of this variety by using one unit of M -labor.
When the manufacturer of variety h produces q(h) units, the prot is
(h) = [p(h)  1]q(h)
which together with the demand function (2) yields the equilibrium price com-
mon to all varieties produced:
p = 1= (12)
Then, if M denotes the number of varieties produced at the time in question,
substituting (12) into (3) yields
P = (1=)(M) 1=( 1) (13)
Furthermore, substituting (12) and (13), we obtain the equilibrium output of
any variety produced in the economy:
q = E=M (14)
whereas the equilibrium prot is given by
 = q=(   1) (15)
since  = (   1)=.
We now study the labor market clearing conditions for the M -workers. In
equilibrium, labor demand is equal to labor supply, so
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L =Mq (16)
and, by (14),
L = E (17)
so that in equilibrium, the total expenditure
E = L= (18)
is independent of time since L is constant. Therefore, we may conclude from
(10) that the equilibrium interest rate is equal to the subjective discount rate
over time
(t) =  for all t  0 (19)
As a result, using (9), the expenditure of any specic consumer i is also a
constant, which is readily obtained from (7) and (19):
Ei = [!i +Wi(0)] (20)
Substituting (13) into (4) and setting Ei(t) = Ei yields
vi(t) =   Ei M(t)
1
 1 (21)
Using (5) and (21), we obtain the lifetime utility of consumer i as
Ui(0) =
Ei

Z 1
0
e t ln(M(t))dt (22)
Finally, using (18) and (22), this sum of M -workersand K-workersutility is
given by
W =
L
   1
Z 1
0
e t ln(M(t))dt (23)
2.3 R & D Sector
Production of a new manufactured commodity requires the purchase of a
patent. These patents are produced by the R & D sector, consisting of N
workers, and they are the only output of this sector. Each new patent embod-
ies a new idea. Not all new ideas result in patents. New ideas are produced
by K-workers using their prior stock of knowledge. The scheme for producing
new ideas is described as a knowledge production process. The basic layout
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of this sector is as follows, and is similar to Berliant and Fujita (forthcoming).
At any given time, each K-worker has a stock of knowledge that has some
commonalities with other K-workers but some knowledge distinct from other
workers. Since workers possess knowledge exclusive of others, they may wish
to cooperate with each other in the knowledge production process. Hetero-
geneity of knowledge in a partnership brings more originality, but knowledge
in common is important for communication. Thus, K-worker heterogeneity
is an essential feature of the model and of the knowledge production process.
The K-workers choose to work alone or with a partner, maximizing their my-
opic payo¤, namely the value of patents produced at that time. The solution
concept used is the myopic core. If they work alone, new ideas are produced
as a function of the total number of ideas known by a K-worker. If a pair of
workers produces new ideas together, their knowledge production is a function
of their knowledge in common on the one hand and the knowledge they have
that is distinct from their partner on the other. Knowledge that is produced
by an agent at a given time becomes part of the stock of knowledge for that
agent in the future. In addition, some of these ideas become patented and are
sold to the manufacturing sector. The ideas embodied in the patents become
public, and will be learned by all the agents in the R & D sector.
The basic unit of knowledge is called an idea.5 The number of potential
ideas is innite. In this paper, we will treat ideas symmetrically.6 In describing
the process of knowledge production, that is either accomplished alone or in
cooperation with another K-worker, the su¢ cient statistics about the state of
knowledge of a K-worker i at a given time can be described as follows. We
shall focus on K-worker i and her potential partner K-worker j. First, ni(t)
represents the total stock of is ideas at time t. Second, ncij(t) represents the
total stock of ideas that i has in common with K-worker j at time t. Third,
ndij(t) represents the stock of ideas that i knows but j doesnt know at time t.
Finally, ndji(t) represents the stock of ideas that j knows but i doesnt know at
time t.
5In principle, all of these time-dependent quantities are positive integers. However, for
simplicity we take them to be continuous (in R+) throughout the paper. One interpretation
is that the creation of an idea occurs at a stochastic time, and the real numbers are taken
to be the expected number of jumps (ideas learned) in a Poisson process. The use of an
integer instead of a real number adds little but complication to the analysis.
6Extensions to idea hierarchies and knowledge structures will be discussed in the conclu-
sions.
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By denition, ncij(t) = n
c
ji(t).
7 It also holds by denition that
ni(t) = n
c
ij(t) + n
d
ij(t) (24)
Knowledge is a set of ideas that are possessed by a person at a particular
time. However, knowledge is not a static concept. New knowledge can be
produced either individually or jointly, and ideas can be shared with others.
But all of this activity takes time.
Now we describe the components of the rest of the model. To keep the
description as simple as possible, we focus on just two agents, i and j. At each
time, each agent faces a decision about whether or not to meet with others. If
two agents want to meet at a particular time, a meeting will occur. If an agent
decides not to meet with anyone at a given time, then the agent produces
separately and also creates new knowledge separately, away from everyone
else. If two persons do decide to meet at a given time, then they collaborate
to create new knowledge together.8
At each moment of time, there are two mutually exclusive ways to produce
new knowledge. The rst way is to work alone, away from others. We denote
the event thatK-worker i does research alone at time t by ii(t) = 1, indicating
that i works with herself. Otherwise, ii(t) = 0. Alternatively, K-worker i
can choose to work with a partner, say K-worker j. We denote the event that
K-worker i wishes to work with j at time t by ij(t) = 1. Otherwise, ij(t) = 0.
In equilibrium, this partnership is realized at time t if ij(t) = ji(t) = 1.
Consider rst the case where K-worker i works alone. In this case, idea
production is simply a function of the stock of is ideas at that time. Let
aii(t) be the rate of production of new ideas created by person i in isolation at
time t. Then we assume that the creation of new knowledge during isolation
is governed by the following equation:
aii(t) =   ni(t) when ii(t) = 1. (25)
If a meeting occurs between i and j at time t (ij(t) = ji(t) = 1), then
joint knowledge creation occurs, and it is governed by the following dynamics:9
aij(t) = 2  (ncij)  (ndij  ndji)
1 
2 when ij(t) = ji(t) = 1 for j 6= i (26)
7In general, however, it is not necessary that ndij(t) = n
d
ji(t).
8Since there is an innity of potential ideas, the probability that the same idea is du-
plicated by any K-worker or K-workers (even at di¤erent points of time) is assumed to be
zero.
9We may generalize equation (26) as follows:
aij(t) = max
n
(  ")ni(t) + (  ")nj(t); 2  (ncij)  (ndij  ndji)
1 
2
o
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where 0 <  < 1,  > 0. So when two people meet, joint knowledge creation
occurs at a rate proportional to the normalized product of their knowledge in
common, the di¤erential knowledge of i from j, and the di¤erential knowledge
of j from i. The rate of creation of new knowledge is high when the proportions
of ideas in common, ideas exclusive to person i, and ideas exclusive to person
j are in balance. The parameter  represents the weight on knowledge in
common as opposed to di¤erential knowledge in the production of new ideas.
Ideas in common are necessary for communication, while ideas exclusive to one
person or the other imply more heterogeneity or originality in the collaboration.
If one person in the collaboration does not have exclusive ideas, there is no
reason for the other person to meet and collaborate. The multiplicative nature
of the function in equation (26) drives the relationship between knowledge
creation and the relative proportions of ideas in common and ideas exclusive
to one or the other agent. Under these circumstances, no knowledge creation
in isolation occurs.
Income for the research sector derives from selling patents. But not all
ideas are patentable. For every collection of ideas created, we assume that
 proportion are patentable as blueprints of new products. Thus, they are
sold to the manufacturing sector. The residual ideas, namely 1  proportion
of new ideas, becomes tacit knowledge that is only known to the creator or
creators of these ideas. They are useful for future creation of yet further
ideas.
Let yi(t) to be the income of K-worker i at time t, and let (t) be the price
of patents at time t. Then, suppressing t for notational simplicity:
yi =     (ii  aii +
X
j 6=i
ij  aij=2) (27)
The formula implies that the revenue from new patents is split evenly if two
K-workers are producing new ideas together.
Concerning the rule used by an agent to choose their best partner, to keep
the model tractable in this rst analysis, we assume a myopic rule. At each
moment of time t, person i would like a meeting with person j when her
income while meeting with j is highest among all potential partners, including
herself. Maximizing income at a given time amounts to choosing fijgNj=1 so
that the right hand side of (27) is highest, meaning that a selection is made
only among the most productive partners. Loosely speaking, this interaction
where " > 0 represents the costs from the lack of concentration. This generalization, however,
does not change the results presented in this paper in any essential way.
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could be modeled as a noncooperative game, with player i choosing fijgNj=1
as strategies, and equilibrium implying that for each pair of players i and j,
j 6= i, ij = ji, whereas ij > 0 only for those players j that yield maximal
payo¤s for player i.10
This noncooperative approach is useful for explaining the ideas behind
our model, but we employ a cooperative approach for two reasons. First,
it gives the same equilibrium path as the noncooperative approach but with
less cumbersome notation and structure. Second, as we are attempting to
model close interactions within groups, it is plausible that agents will act
cooperatively. We assume that at each time, the myopic persons interacting
choose a core conguration. That is, we restrict attention to congurations
such that at any point in time, no coalition of persons can get together and
make themselves better o¤ in that time period. In essence, our solution concept
at a point in time is the myopic core.
All agents take prices, in this case , as given, implying:
max
fijgNj=1
(ii  aii +
X
j 6=i
ij  aij=2) (28)
subject to the obvious constraints:
NX
j=1
ij = 1, ij  0 for i = 1; :::; N (29)
Since ni is a stock variable, this is equivalent to
max
fijgNj=1
(
ii  aii +
P
j 6=i ij  aij=2
ni
) (30)
In order to rewrite this problem in a convenient form, we rst dene the
total number of ideas possessed by i and j:
nij = ndij + n
d
ji + n
c
ij (31)
and dene new variables
mcij  mcji =
ncij
nij
=
ncji
nij
mdij =
ndij
nij
, mdji =
ndji
nij
10More formally, out of equilibrium payo¤s are dened and a selection or renement of
Nash equilibrium used as in Berliant et al. (2006, pp. 77-78). A renement of Nash
equilibrium is necessary to exclude some trivial equilibria, for example where nobody ever
chooses to meet anyone else.
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By denition, mdij represents the proportion of ideas exclusive to person i
among all the ideas known by person i or person j. Similarly, mcij represents
the proportion of ideas known in common by persons i and j among all the
ideas known by the pair. From (31), we obtain
1 = mdij +m
d
ji +m
c
ij (32)
whereas (31) and (24) yield
ni = (1 mdji)  nij (33)
Using these identities and new variables, while recalling the knowledge
production function (26) and (25), we obtain (see Technical Appendix a for
details)
aij=2
ni
= G(mdij;m
d
ji) (34)
where
G(mdij;m
d
ji) 

 
1 mdij  mdji
  (mdij mdji) 1 2
1 mdji
(35)
Using (25) and (34), we can rewrite the income function (27) as
yi =     ni  (ii  +
X
j 6=i
ij G(mdij;mdji)) (36)
and the optimization problem (30) as follows:
max
fijgNj=1
(ii  +
X
j 6=i
ij G(mdij;mdji)) (37)
subject to the obvious constraints (29).
Suppose that for each i = 1; 2; :::; N , fijgNj=1 solves the optimization prob-
lem immediately above. Furthermore, suppose that it happens to be the case
that
ij = 

ji for i; j = 1; 2; :::; N
Then, by construction, fijgNi;j=1 must also be the solution to the following
social optimization problem:
maxf
NX
i=1
yi j
NX
j=1
ij = 1, ij  0, ij = ji for i; j = 1; 2; :::; Ng
Thus, fijgNi;j=1 is in the myopic core.
We now describe the dynamics of the knowledge system, dropping the time
argument. There are two ways to acquire new knowledge for a K-worker:
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internal production of new ideas and information from public sources. The
rst way has the feature that ideas produced alone are attributed to that
worker, whereas ideas produced in pairs are attributed to both K-workers
who produce them. In either case, the new ideas are learned by exactly
the people who produce them. The second source of knowledge acquisition
derives from the new ideas that are patented. The patented ideas become
public information. A certain proportion of patented ideas, (N), are learned
by all of the K-workers. In general, (N) will be a decreasing function of N .
Limited time and energy determine how many of these new, public ideas can
be learned. Due to these limitations, the amount of information a K-worker
can learn from patents at a given time is, roughly, proportional to the number
of new ideas she can create in that time. The number of new ideas and thus
patents is proportional to the number of K-workers, so (N) will be inversely
proportional to N .11 Thus, these ideas become knowledge in common for all
agents in the research sector.12 The net result is an increase in ncij for all i and
j of (N)   proportion of new ideas created in the economy. The workers in
the R & D sector see this ow of new ideas from patents, and account for it
when they choose actions at each moment of time. To obtain an expression
relating _mdij to m
d
ij, we must rst examine the knowledge dynamics in terms
of the original variables, ni, ncij, and n
d
ij.
Let us focus on agent i, as the expressions for the other agents are analo-
gous. Let A be the total number of ideas created at a given moment:
A =
NX
k=1
kk  akk + (
NX
k=1
X
l 6=k
kl  akl)=2 (38)
=
NX
k=1
kk  nk +
NX
k=1
X
l 6=k
kl  nk G(mdkl;mdlk) (39)
The dynamics of the knowledge system are based on the assumption that
once learned, ideas are not forgotten. Using the argument above, we obtain
11In theory, it might be possible to accumulate a stock of ideas patented in past periods to
learn in the future. The problem with this is that such information perpetually accumulates,
and thus due to time constraints there is never an opportunity to learn the content of older
patented ideas.
12It has been suggested that if K-workers become too homogeneous, they might learn
the patented ideas selectively so as not to overlap with the knowledge acquired by other
K-workers in the same fashion. However, this level of coordination, especially when N is
large, seems far-fetched. It seems more likely that ideas attractive for whatever reason will
be learned by all.
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knowledge system dynamics:
_ni =
NX
l=1
il  ail + (N)    (A 
NX
l=1
il  ail) (40)
_ncij = ij  aij + (N)    (A  ij  aij) for all j 6= i (41)
_ndij = (1  (N)  ) 
X
k 6=j
ik  aik for all j 6= i (42)
Thus, equation (40) says that the increase in the knowledge of person i is the
sum of: the knowledge created in isolation, the knowledge created jointly with
someone else, and the transfer of new knowledge from new patents. Equation
(41) means that the increase in the knowledge in common for persons i and j
equals the new knowledge created jointly by them plus the transfer of knowl-
edge from new patents. Finally, equation (42) means that all the knowledge
created by person i either in isolation or joint with persons other than person
j becomes a part of the di¤erential knowledge of person i from person j, except
for patented ideas that are learned by all K-workers.
Using (25) and (34), equation (40) can be rewritten as
_ni = (1  (N)  )  ni  (ii+ 2
NX
l 6=i
il G(mdil;mdli)) + (N)    A (43)
where A is given by (39). Furthermore, using (25), (26), and (34), we have
(see Theorem A2 of Technical Appendix a)
_mdij = (1    )(1 mdij)(1 mdji)
(
ii  +
X
k 6=i;j
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)
)
(44)
 mdij[(1 mdji) 
NX
k=1
kk  nk
ni
+ (1    )  ij 
 
1 mdji
  2G(mdij;mdji)
+     1 mdji NX
k=1
X
l 6=k
kl  nk
ni
G(mdkl;mdlk)]
 mdij  (1    ) 
 
1 mdij
 (jj  +X
k 6=i;j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)
)
for i; j = 1; 2;    ; N , i 6= j. Thus, using (43) and (44), the knowledge
dynamics are described in terms of ni and mdij (i; j = 1; :::; N) only.
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3 Knowledge Dynamics
3.1 The Model
Since we are concerned with the macro behavior of the economy and the big
picture in terms of growth, we make a number of simplifying assumptions. We
impose the assumption that the initial state of knowledge for all K-workers is
pairwise symmetric in terms of heterogeneity. The initial state of knowledge
is given by
ncij(0) = n
c(0) for all i 6= j (45)
ndij(0) = n
d(0) for all i 6= j (46)
implying that
ni(0) = n
c(0) + nd(0)  n(0) (47)
At the initial state, each pair of K-workers has the same number of ideas,
nc(0), in common. Moreover, for any pair of K-workers, the number of ideas
that one K-worker knows but the other does not know is the same and equal
to nd(0). Given that the initial state of knowledge is symmetric among the
K-workers, it turns out that the equilibrium conguration at any time also
maintains the basic pairwise symmetry among K-workers.
Suppose that at some given time, all K-workers are pairwise symmetric to
each other. Namely, when
mdij = m
d
ji for all i 6= j (48)
(37) is simplied as
max
fijgNj=1
(ii  +
X
j 6=i
ij  g(mdij)) (49)
where the function g is dened as
g(m)  G(m;m)   (1  2m)
m(1 )
1 m (50)
Since nij = nji by denition, we can readily see, by using (33), that condi-
tion (48) is equivalent to
ni = nj for all i and j (51)
Furthermore, since aij = aji by denition, substituting (48) into (34) yields
aij=2
ni
=
aji=2
nj
= g(mdij) (52)
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Thus, when two K-workers i and j cooperate in knowledge production and
their knowledge states are symmetric, g(mdij) represents the creation of new
ideas per capita (normalized by the size of individual knowledge input, ni).
In this context, condition (49) means that each K-worker wishes to engage
in knowledge production in a partnership with a person (possibly including
herself) leading to the highest K-productivity.
Figure 1 illustrates the graph of the function g(m) as a bold curve for
parameter values  = 1 and  = 1=3.
FIGURE 1 GOES HERE
Di¤erentiating g(m) yields
g0(m) = g(m)  (1  )  (2  ) m
(1  2m) m  (1 m)
implying that
g0(m)
>
<
0 as m
<
>
1  
2   for m 2 (0;
1
2
) (53)
Thus, g(m) is strictly quasi-concave on [0; 1=2], achieving its maximal value at
mB =
1  
2   (54)
which we call the Bliss Point. It is the point where knowledge productivity
is highest for each person. In the remainder of the paper, our main concern
is whether or not the dynamics of knowledge interaction will, starting at the
initial state given by (45) and (46), lead the system of K-workers to this bliss
point.
When condition (48) holds, using (50) and (51), the dynamics can be writ-
ten as
_mdij
1 mdij
= (1    )  (1 mdij) 
(
ii  +
X
k 6=i;j
ik  2g(mdik)
)
 mdij
(
     
NX
k=1
kk + (1    )  ij  2g(mdij) +    
NX
k=1
X
l 6=k
kl  g(mdkl)
)
 mdij(1    ) 
(
jj  +
X
k 6=i;j
jk  2g(mdkj)
)
(55)
_ni = (1  (N)  )  ni 
 
ii  + 2
X
k 6=i
ik  g(mdik)
!
+ (N)    A (56)
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for i; j = 1; 2; :::; N , where A is given by
A =
NX
k=1
kk  nk +
NX
k=1
X
l 6=k
kl  nk  g(mdkl) (57)
We observe that the basic rules, (49), (55), and (43), that govern the knowl-
edge dynamics are described in terms of mdij and ni (i; j = 1; 2; :::N) only.
Notice that no market variable is used. This enables us rst to solve for
the equilibrium path of knowledge dynamics independent of commodity and
capital markets.
Next, taking the case of N = 4, we illustrate the possible equilibrium con-
gurations of partnerships in knowledge creation, noting that the equilibrium
conguration can vary with time. Figure 2 gives the possibilities at any xed
time for N = 4. Given that the initial state of knowledge is symmetric among
the four K-workers, as noted above, the equilibrium conguration at any time
also maintains the basic symmetry among K-workers.
FIGURE 2 GOES HERE
Panel (a) in Figure 2 represents the case in which each of the four K-workers is
working alone, creating new ideas in isolation. Panels (b-1) to (b-3) represent
the three possible congurations of partnerships, in which two couples each
work separately but simultaneously. In panel (b-1), for example, 1 and 2 work
together. At the same time, 3 and 4 work together.
Although panels (a) to (b-3) represent the basic forms of knowledge creation
with four persons, it turns out that the equilibrium path often requires a
mixture of these basic forms. That is, on the equilibrium path, people wish
to change partners as frequently as possible. The purpose is to balance the
number of di¤erent and common ideas with partners as best as can be achieved.
This suggests a work pattern with rapidly changing partners on the equilibrium
path.
Please refer to panels (c-1) to (c-3) in Figure 2. Each of these panels
represents a work pattern where a worker rotates through two xed partners
as fast as possible in order to maximize the instantaneous increase in their
income. In panel (c-1), for example, worker 1 chooses K-workers 2 and 3 as
partners, and rotates between the two partners under equilibrium values of 12
and 13 such that 12 + 13 = 1. K-workers 2, 3 and 4 behave analogously. In
order for this type of work pattern to take place, of course, all four persons
must agree to follow this pattern. Finally, panel (d) depicts a work pattern in
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which each worker rotates though all three possible partners as fast as possible.
That is, for all i 6= j, ij 2 (0; 1), and for all i, ii = 0 and
P
j 6=i ij = 1.
At this point, it is useful to remind the reader that we are using a myopic
core concept to determine equilibrium at each point in time. In fact, it is
necessary to sharpen that concept in the model with N persons. When there
is more than one vector of strategies that is in the myopic core at a particular
time, namely more than one vector of joint strategies implies the same, highest
income for all persons, the one with the highest rst derivative of income _yi is
selected. Furthermore, when the derivative of income is still the same among
best options, agent i chooses an option that maximizes the second derivative
of income,
::
yi, and so on. The justication for this assumption is that at each
point in time, people are attempting to maximize the ow of income. The
formal denition of the myopic core and proof that it is nonempty can be found
in Berliant and Fujita (forthcoming, Appendix 0). Although the theorem is
general, in the remainder of this paper we shall focus on the symmetric case.
3.2 Equilibrium Path of Knowledge Dynamics
Now we are ready to investigate the actual equilibrium path, depending on the
given initial composition of knowledge,
mdij(0) = m
d(0) =
nd(0)
nc(0) + 2nd(0)
which is common for all pairs i and j (i 6= j). In order to sharpen the results
that follow, we introduce a specic form of the parametric function (N),
representing the proportion of the public information on new patents that is
actually learned by K-workers as knowledge in common. Assuming that the
ow of knowledge that each K-worker can acquire from public information on
new patents is proportional to the ow of new knowledge she can produce,
we use the following relation in the analysis below (see Appendix 1 for a
justication):
(N) =
C
N
or
(N)   = C
N
(58)
where C is a positive constant representing the learning capacity (l-capacity)
of each K-worker. Assuming a large economy with su¢ ciently large N , in the
rest of paper we assume that
N > C (59)
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In the remainder of this paper, we assume that
 < g(mB) (60)
so as to avoid the trivial case of all agents always working in isolation.
In Figure 1, let mJ and mI be dened on the horizontal axis at the left in-
tersection and the right intersection between the g(m) curve and the horizontal
line at height , respectively.
In the following analyses, the various cases are determined by the initial
heterogeneity of the K-workers. For each case, the associated pattern of
knowledge creation in equilibrium is illustrated using the diagrams in Figure
2, that provides detail for the case N = 4. To be precise:
Proposition 1: The equilibrium path of K-worker interactions and the
sink point of the knowledge creation process depend discontinuously on the
initial condition, md(0). Assuming that the number of K-workers N is large,
the pattern of interaction between K-workers and the sink point as a function
of the initial condition are as follows.
(i) For mJ < md(0)  mB, we dene two subcases. Let eC  2
1  .
(a) C < eC. The equilibrium path consists of an initial time interval
in which each K-worker is always paired with another but trades partners as
rapidly as possible (with ij = 1=(N   1) for all i and for all j 6= i). When
the bliss point, mB = 1 
2  , is attained, the agents split into groups of
eNB =
1 + 1
  (1 )C
2
, and they remain at the bliss point.
(b) C > eC. The equilibrium path has all K-workers paired with
another but trading partners as rapidly as possible (with ij = 1=(N   1) for
all i and for all j 6= i). This continues forever. The equilibrium path remains
to the left of the bliss point, so the bliss point is never attained. The sink point
is emd = 1
2+C
2
.
(ii) md(0) < mJ < mB. Once again, there are two subcases. If C is
large, then all K-workers are in isolation producing new ideas alone forever.
The sink point is emd = 1
2+C
. If C is not large, then the equilibrium path
consists of a rst phase in which all K-workers are in isolation producing new
ideas. Once the system reaches mJ , the equilibrium path follows that given in
case (i).
(iii) mB < md(0) The equilibrium path consists of many phases. First,
the N K-workers are paired arbitrarily and work with their partners for a
nonempty interval of time. Second, they switch to new partners and work with
their new partners for a nonempty interval of time. Third, each K-worker
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pairs alternately with the two partners with whom they worked in the rst two
phases, but not with a K-worker with whom they have not worked previously.
This process continues, possibly adding more partners.
We wish to alert the reader that the focus of the remainder of
the paper, in particular our analysis of economic growth, will be on
case (i). Thus, we shall not discuss the other cases in great detail.
3.2.1 Case (i): mJ < md(0)  mB
First suppose that the initial state is such that
mJ < md(0) < mB
Then, since g(mdij(0)) = g
 
md(0)

>  for any possible work pairs consisting
of i and j, no person wishes to work alone at the start. However, since the value
of g(mdij(0)) is the same for all possible pairs, all forms of (b-1) to (d) in Figure
2 are possible equilibrium work congurations at the start. To determine which
one of them will actually take place on the equilibrium path, we must consider
the rst derivative of income for all persons.
In general, consider any time at which all persons have the same composi-
tion of knowledge:
mdij = m
d for all i 6= j (61)
where
g(md) > 
Focus on person i; the equations for other persons are analogous. Since person
i does not wish to work alone, it follows that
ii = 0 and
X
j 6=i
ij = 1 (62)
Substituting (61) and (62) into (27) and using (52) yields
yi =     ni  g(md) (63)
Likewise, substituting (58), (61) and (62) into (55) and arranging terms gives
_mdij = _m
d = 2
 
1 mdg(md)(1  C
N
)  (1  2md)  (1  C
N
)  (1 md)  ij   C
2
md

(64)
for i 6= j.
Since the income function (63) is independent of the values of ij (j 6= i),
in order to examine what values of ij(j 6= i) person i wishes to choose, we
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must consider the time derivative of yi. In doing so, however, we cannot use
equation (63) because the original variables have been replaced. Instead, we
must go back to the original equation (36). Then, using equations (61) to (64)
and setting ij = ji (which must hold for any feasible meeting), we obtain
the following (see Berliant and Fujita, forthcoming, Technical Appendix b for
proof):
_yi = _    ni  g(md) +     _ni  g(md) (65)
+    ni 
X
j 6=i
ij  g0(md)  _mdij
where
_ni = g(m
d)  ni  (2 + N   2
N
 C) (66)
and _mdij is given by (64). Substituting (64) into (65) and setting
P
j 6=i ij = 1
yields
_yi = _    ni  g(md) +     _ni  g(md) (67)
+    ni  2
 
1 md  g(md)  g0(md) (
(1  C
N
)  (1  2md)  (1  C
N
)  (1 md) 
X
j 6=i
2ij  
C
2
md
)
All K-workers take  and _ as given, whereas ni is a state variable. Further-
more, the value of _ni given above is independent of the values of ij for j 6= i.
Thus, choosing the values of ij for j 6= i is equivalent to choosing the values
that maximize the last term in (67).
Now, suppose that
md < mB
and hence g0(md) > 0. Then, assuming that C
N
< 1, in order to maximize
the time derivative of the income, person i must solve the following quadratic
minimization problem:
min
X
j 6=i
2ij subject to
X
j 6=i
ij = 1 (68)
which yields the solution for person i:
ij =
1
N   1 for all j 6= i (69)
Although we have focused on person i, the vector of optimal strategies is the
same for all persons. Thus, all persons agree to a knowledge creation pattern
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in which each person rotates through all N   1 possible partners, sharing time
equally.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The condition md < mB
means that the K-workers have relatively too many ideas in common, and
thus they wish to acquire ideas that are di¤erent from those of each possible
partner as fast as possible. That is, when mJ < mdij = m
d < mB in Figure
1, each K-worker wishes to move the knowledge composition mdij to the right
as quickly as possible, thus increasing the K-productivity g(mdij) as fast as
possible.
Concerning the general case withN  4, whenmJ < md(0) = mdji(0) < mB
for all i 6= j, on the equilibrium path, eachK-worker i spends the same amount
of time ij = 1= (N   1) for all j 6= i with every other K-worker at the start.
Then, since the symmetric condition (61) holds from the start onward, the
same work pattern will continue as long as mJ < md < mB. The dynamics
of this work pattern are as follows. The creation of new ideas always takes
place in pairs. Pairs are cycling rapidly with ij = 1= (N   1) for all j 6= i.
K-worker 1, for example, spends 1= (N   1) of each period with K-worker 2,
for example, and (N   2) = (N   1) of the time working with other partners.
Setting mdij = m
d and ij = 1= (N   1) in (64), we obtain
_md = 2(1 md)  g(md)  1 
C
N
N   1
(
(N   2) md
"
(2N   3) + C
2
 N   1
1  C
N
#)
(70)
Setting _md = 0 and considering that md < 1, we obtain the sink point
md =
N   2
(2N   3) + C
2
 N 1
1 C
N
(71)
As N increases, the value of mdincreases monotonically (provided N > C)
eventually reaching the limit
emd = 1
2 + C
2
(72)
In the upper half of Figure 3, the K-productivity curve g(m) is transferred
from Figure 1. In the bottom half of Figure 3, the bold curve depicts the
limiting sink, emd, as a function of the l-capacity parameter C. When N is
su¢ ciently large, the actual sink curve, md, is close to this limiting curve.
FIGURE 3 GOES HERE
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In the context of Figure 3, we can identify two di¤erent possibilities. Sup-
pose that
mB < md (73)
That is, the sink point of the dynamics given in (70) is on the right side of
the bliss point. In this case, beginning at any point mJ < md(0) < mB,
the system reaches the bliss point in nite time. In terms of the original
parameters, using (54) and (71), condition (73) can be rewritten as
C <

2 
1    2N 3N 2
	  (N   1)
2 
1    2N 3N 2 + N2
(74)
Since md ! emd, when N is su¢ ciently large, condition (74) can be expressed
as
C < eC  2
1   (75)
In Figure 3, C1 provides an example of this case. The associated sink point
is given by md1 .
In contrast, suppose that
md < mB (76)
This occurs exactly when the inequality in (74) is reversed. Assuming that
N is su¢ ciently large, it occurs when the inequality in (75) is reversed. In
Figure 3, C2 represents an example of such a value of C, whereas the associated
sink point is given by md2 . In this case, starting with any initial point m
J <
md(0) < mB, the system moves automatically toward md < mB, but never
reaches the bliss point.
On the downward vertical axis of Figure 3, eC gives the value of the para-
meter C at the boundary of the two cases. Case (73) occurs exactly when the
value of the l-capacity C is relatively small, whereas case (76) occurs when C
is relatively large. In what follows, under the assumption that N is large, we
examine the actual dynamics in each of the two cases.
Case (i-a): mJ < md(0)  mB and C < eC When condition (73) holds,
starting with any initial point mJ < md(0)  mB, the system following the
dynamics (64) reaches the bliss point mB in nite time. Let tB be the time
at which all K-workers reach the bliss point. At time tB, we have
mdij = m
d = mB for i 6= j (77)
and g0(md) = g0(mB) = 0. Thus, (67) becomes
_yi = _    ni  g(md) +     _ni  g(md) (78)
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that is, again, independent of the values of ij (j 6= i). Thus, we consider
the second order condition for income maximization. Replace g(md) with
G(mdij;m
d
ji) in (65) and take the time derivative of the resulting equation.
Using (77) and the fact that g0(mB) = 0, by following the logic in Berliant and
Fujita (forthcoming, Technical Appendix b) we obtain
::
yi =
::
    ni  g(mB) + 2 _    _ni  g(mB) +     ::ni  g(md) (79)
+    ni  (1 mB)2  4(mB)2g00(mB) (X
i6=j
ij 

(1  C
N
)  (1  2mB)  (1  C
N
)  (1 mB)  ij   C
2
mB
)2
where, using (66),
_ni = g(m
B)  ni  (2 + N   2
N
C)
::
ni = g(m
B)  _ni  (2 + N   2
N
C)
Since the rst three terms on the right hand side of (79) are independent of
the values of ij (j 6= i) whereas g00 < 0, choosing the values of ij (j 6= i) to
maximize
::
yi is equivalent to the following optimization problem:
min
fijg
(X
i6=j
ij 

(1  C
N
)  (1  2mB)  (1  C
N
)  (1 mB)  ij   C
2
mB
)2
(80)
subject to
X
j 6=i
ij = 1
This problem can be solved by using the rule that whenever ij > 0, the value
of the terms inside the square brackets in expression (80) must be zero, or
ij > 0 =) ij =
(1  C
N
)  (1  2mB)  C
2
mB
(1  C
N
)  (1 mB)  
B (81)
whereas the number of partners for K-worker i must be chosen to satisfy the
constraint
P
j 6=i ij = 1. This applies to all K-workers.
This equilibrium conguration of partnerships at the bliss point mB can be
achieved as follows: When the system reaches mB, the population splits into
smaller groups of equal size,13
NB  1 + 1
B
(82)
13The conguration of workers necessary to maintain the bliss point is not unique. Each
K-worker must have NB   1 links to other K-workers, communicating with each for an
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so each person works with NB   1 other persons in their group for the same
proportion of time, B. Recalling (64), rule (81) is equivalent to
ij > 0 =) _mdij = 0 at mdij = mB
That is, when all K-workers reach the bliss point, they stay there by splitting
into smaller groups of the same size, NB, so direct interactions take place
only within each group. In this way, each K-worker maintains the highest
K-productivity while enjoying the knowledge externalities derived from public
information on new patents. Figure 4 depicts an example of an equilibrium
conguration of K-worker interactions in which four groups of K-workers form
at the bliss point. The dotted arrows represent indirect interactions through
the public revelation of patent information.
FIGURE 4 GOES HERE
Substituting (54) into (81), using (82) and arranging terms, the optimal
group size NB is given by
NB = 1 +
1
   (1 )C
2
 N
N C
(83)
As N becomes large, the optimal group size approaches
eNB = 1 + 1
   (1 )C
2
(84)
The optimal group size for large population eNB (as well as the optimal group
size for nite population NB) increases monotonically with the l-capacity, C;
as C increases, the transmission of public knowledge in common increases, so
it is necessary to have a larger group in order to maintain heterogeneity among
agents within the group. Recalling that eC was dened in (75), the group size
equal share of time. For example, when NB = 4, groups of 4 may form, where each worker
within a group communicates equally with every other worker in that group. However, with
NB = 4 it is also possible to have, say, groups of six forming. With such groups, each K-
worker has communication links to only three other K-workers within their group. So not
all possible links within a group are actually active. If groups at the bliss point are larger,
then their communication structure must become more sparse to maintain the bliss point.
The minimal size of groups that coalesce at the bliss point is clearly NB . Nevertheless,
all of the calculations apply independent of the size of groups that form at the bliss point.
The same remarks apply to the various cases detailed below, except when K-workers are in
isolation.
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becomes innitely large as C approaches eC from the left. Recalling that 
is the weight given to knowledge in common in the K-production function, as
the value of  increases, eNB decreases, which is not surprising. In Figure 5,
for each xed value of the parameter C, the optimal group size eNB is graphed
as a function of .
FIGURE 5 GOES HERE
Substituting B = 1=(NB 1) for ij in equation (64), then by construction,
mB is the sink point of the dynamics
_mdij = 2
 
1 mdg(md)(1  C
N
)  (1  2md)  (1  C
N
)  (1 md)  1
NB   1  
C
2
md

(85)
for i 6= j but i and j in the same group. Thus, starting with any initial point
mdij(0) = m
d(0) 2 (0; 1=2), if each person participates in a group ofNB persons,
and if they maintain the same group structure where each person works with
each of the NB 1 other people in their group for the same proportion of time
B, then the system monotonically approaches the bliss point mB. However,
when mdij(0) = m
d(0) < mB, if all N persons form a single group while setting
ij = 1=(N   1), the system can reach the bliss point mB fastest.14
When the system reaches the bliss point, the workers break into groups and
the system becomes asymmetric, in the following sense. If K-worker i belongs
to the same group as K-worker k, then their di¤erential knowledge remains
at the bliss point mB, maintaining the highest K-productivity g(mB). If K-
worker j belongs to a di¤erent group, then the di¤erential knowledge between
i and j diverges, namely it moves away from mB, thus reducing g(mdij). So
once the population splits into groups, K-workers i and j will not want to
collaborate again.
Formally, setting ij = 0 in equation (64), the dynamics of di¤erential
knowledge for K-workers i and j in di¤erent groups is given by
_mdij = _m
d = 2
 
1 md  g(md) (1  C
N
)  (1  2md)  C
2
md

(86)
that yields a sink point
md =
1
2 + C
2(1 C
N
)
14With a starting point mdij(0) = m
d(0) < mB , if the population forms groups of size less
than N but larger than NB , then the system will still reach the bliss point, but at a slower
speed than if the group size were N .
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As N !1, the sink point becomes
md =
1
2 + C
2
= emd (87)
Notice that this is the same as expression (72). As the number of K-workers
becomes large, the di¤erence between pairs of workers who interact at intensity
1=(N   1) and pairs of workers in di¤erent groups who dont interact is close
to zero, so they tend to the same sink point.
To sum up, for partnerships of K-workers within the same group, their
productivity is g(mB). For potential partnerships of K-workers in di¤erent
groups, their potential productivity is g(emd) < g(mB). So these potential
partnerships are never formed.
The implication is that we have endogenous formation of cohesive groups.
One interpretation of this phenomenon is that the groups represent research
rms, so we have endogenous formation of research rm boundaries.
Case (i-b): mJ < md(0)  mB and C > eC As explained previously, in
this case the dynamics imply that only one large group forms, so each agent
works with everyone else an equal amount of time. Heterogeneity md changes,
approaching the sink point md given by (71) to the left of the bliss point, so
the bliss point is never reached. In this case
mJ < md < mB
and one large group is maintained forever, without achieving the highest pos-
sible productivity. Intuitively, this is due to the large externality from public
knowledge, so it is impossible to attain su¢ cient heterogeneity.15
3.2.2 Case (ii): md(0) < mJ < mB
Under this set of parameters, g(md(0)) < . In other words, at time 0 it
is best for everyone to work in isolation rather than in pairs. Substituting
ii = 1 and ij = 0 for i 6= j into (55), and using (58), we obtain dynamics for
work in isolation:
_mdij = _m
d =
 
1 md   (1  C
N
)  (1  2md)  C md

(88)
15When C is very large, it is possible that md < mJ , implying that all K-workers
eventually work in isolation. However, this is not an interesting situation, so we neglect it
in the discussion that follows.
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that yields the sink point
md =
1
2 + C
1 C
N
As N !1, the sink point approaches
emd = 1
2 + C
Evidently, emd < emd. When N is su¢ ciently large, it follows that
md < md
Focusing on this case, there are two possibilities, namely mJ < md and
mJ > md.16 Assuming C is not too large, we concentrate on the rst
possibility,
mJ < md (89)
The equilibrium path has every K-worker in isolation to begin, creating new
knowledge on their own and moving to the right until they all reach the point
mJ . Then one large group forms and all K-workers create new knowledge
working in pairs where each spends equal time with every other. From here,
the equilibrium path is exactly the same as in case (i).
3.2.3 Case (iii): mB < md(0)
As this case is not the focus of our work, we have relegated it to subsection 2
of the appendix.
4 Growth
Next we assemble the various pieces of our general equilibrium model. Our
focus is on case (i-a) of the knowledge dynamics, where the initial state of
knowledge heterogeneity is to the left of the bliss point: mJ < md(0) < mB.
Proposition 2: Assume that the number of K-workers N is large and
mJ < md(0) < mB.17 Let eC  2
1  . Then the long run economic growth as a
function of the initial condition is given by two subcases.
16Under the second possibility, md < mJ , each K-worker creates knowledge in isolation
forever, approaching the sink point md.
17For the sake of simplicity, the assumption that N is su¢ ciently large means that the
results stated here take N to be set to 1.
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(a) C < eC. Let tB be the time that all K-workers reach the bliss point
mB. Then
_n(t)
n(t)
= g(mB)(2 + C) for t  tB:
Moreover,
lim
t!1
_M(t)
M(t)
= (1  )1   (2 + C)
and
lim
t!1
_vi(t)
vi(t)
=
(1  )1   (2 + C)
   1 :
(b) C > eC. Then
lim
t!1
_n(t)
n(t)
= lim
t!1
_M(t)
M(t)
= 2(
C
2
)
whereas
lim
t!1
_vi(t)
vi(t)
=
2(C
2
)
   1 :
Therefore long run economic growth is positively related to both , the
parameter reecting K-productivity of work in pairs, and C, the speed of public
knowledge transmission.
4.1 Case (i-a): mJ < md(0)  mB and C < eC
Recall from equation (69) that the initial pattern of knowledge creation has
each K-worker interacting with every other K-worker for an equal share of
time, so the dynamics are symmetric and given by (70). The associated sink
point is given by (71). Summarizing, the assumption of case (i-a) implies that
the sink point, where each K-worker is interacting with every other K-worker
with the same intensity, is to the right of the bliss point:
mJ < md(0) < mB < md
Let tB be the unique nite time such that the dynamics reach the bliss
point, so that when i and j belong to the same group:
mdij(t) = m
d(t) = mB for t  tB.
Due to the symmetry of the path in case (i-a), for all t when ij(t) > 0,
g(mdij(t)) = g(m
d(t))
ni(t) = n(t)
aij(t) = a(t) = n(t)  2g(md(t))
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In particular
g(md(t)) = g(mB) for t  tB
a(t) = n(t)  2g(mB) for t  tB
Setting md = mB in equation (66), we have
_n(t) = n(t)  B for t  tB
where
B  g(mB)(2 + C)
so
_n(t)
n(t)
= B for t  tB (90)
Thus, once the system reaches the bliss point, the size of each K-workers
knowledge expands at an exponential rate of B, and we have:
n(t) = n(tB)  eB(t tB) for t  tB
Recall that the number of varieties of manufactured goods at time t, that is
equal to the number of patents present at time t, is given byM(t). Since A(t)
is the total number of ideas created at time t, whereas the the proportion of
new ideas that are patented is given by , the rate of increase in patents at
time t is given by
_M(t) =   A(t) (91)
In the present context of case (i-a), using equation (38),
A(t) =
N  a(t)
2
= N  n(t)  g(md(t))
and hence
_M(t) =  N  n(t)  g(md(t))
In particular,
_M(t) =  N  g(mB)  n(tB)  eB(t tB) for t  tB (92)
With this in hand, we can proceed to the calculation of the asymptotic rate of
growth of patents. First, for t  tB:
M(t) =M(tB) +
Z t
tB
_M()d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Using (92), Z t
tB
_M()d =  N  g(mB)  n(tB)  e
B(t tB)   1
B
Hence
_M(t)
M(t)
=
 N  g(mB)  n(tB)  eB(t tB)
M(tB) +  N  g(mB)  n(tB)  eB(t tB) 1
B
implying
lim
t!1
_M(t)
M(t)
= B  g(mB)(2 + C) (93)
= (1  )1   (2 + C)
Notice that the asymptotic growth rate of M is the same as the asymptotic
growth rate of n.
Next we calculate the rate of growth of indirect utility of consumers. Using
(4) and (20), for any consumer i, we have:
vi(t) = Ei  M(t)1=( 1)
Since Ei is constant, this leads to
_vi(t)
vi(t)
=
1
   1 
_M(t)
M(t)
Thus, using (93)
lim
t!1
_vi(t)
vi(t)
=
B
   1 =
g(mB)(2 + C)
   1 (94)
=
(1  )1   (2 + C)
   1
Therefore the growth rate of indirect utility approaches a constant.
In summary, the growth rate of the individual stock of knowledge (90), the
growth rate of patents (93) and the growth rate of indirect utility (94) approach
constants as t tends to innity. These constants are positively related to both
C and .
It is not surprising that , the coe¢ cient on the joint knowledge production
function, is positively related to the growth of the economy. In contrast,
it is surprising that C is positively related to economic growth. On the
face of it, when C is higher, agents become relatively homogeneous quicker,
since the public transmission of patent knowledge is faster. In theory, it could
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be the case that the result is lower K-productivity and thus lower economic
growth because the higher homogeneity reduces knowledge productivity. This
was our initial conjecture. However, in the model, as indicated by (83) or
(84), the group size at the bliss point adjusts optimally to the speed of public
transmission of knowledge. Group size increases to o¤set the higher speed of
public knowledge transmission and the resulting increase in group homogeneity.
The e¤ect of larger groups at the bliss point is to create more heterogeneity
within groups, thus maintaining higher economic growth. This is, in essence,
a general equilibrium e¤ect that allows the economy to take advantage of a
higher speed of public information transmission.18
4.2 Case (i-b): mJ < md(0)  mB and C > eC
The assumption that applies for this case implies that emd < mB. This case
is very similar to the previous one. The only change in the calculations is
that g(mB) is replaced with g(emd), where emd is given by equation (72). The
system tends to emd as t!1. Dening
  g(emd)  (2 + C)
= 2(
C
2
)
Analogous calculations yield
lim
t!1
_n(t)
n(t)
=  (95)
lim
t!1
_M(t)
M(t)
=   2(C
2
)
lim
t!1
_vi(t)
vi(t)
=

   1 =
2(C
2
)
   1 (96)
Again, the asymptotic growth rate of individual knowledge stock, patents,
and indirect utility are constants (di¤erent from case (i-a)), and depend posi-
tively on  and C. The surprising result here is that even though the system
does not achieve the bliss point, a higher rate of public knowledge transmis-
sion results in higher economic growth. Even though emd decreases as C
increases, and thus the productivity of partnerships g(emd) declines, notice
18Based on macro equilibrium conditions of the economy, we have derived the relation
(20), meaning that the total expenditure per unit of time is a constant independent of time.
In Technical Appendix b, using individual budget constraints, we show that the relation
(20) indeed holds along the equilibrium path.
34
that g(emd) represents the normalized productivity of partnerships. In fact,
the total productivity of partnerships is n  g(emd). In the end, the positive
e¤ect of increasing n due to public knowledge spillovers more than o¤sets the
negative e¤ect of a decline in g(emd).
5 E¢ ciency
Next we consider the welfare properties of the equilibrium path. Clearly, it is
rst necessary to introduce a concept of constrained e¢ ciency that accounts
for the nature of the monopolistic competition environment in the market for
consumption commodities. There is a market failure associated with this
feature of the model in itself. However, that is not the focus of our work.
Therefore, we employ a notion of constrained e¢ ciency that allows a planner
to search for Pareto improvements by using only the choice of the time path
of partnerships in the R & D sector, with perfect foresight of the consequences
for the other sectors of the model; in particular, the consumption good market
features monopolistic competition once the time path in the R & D sector is
chosen.
Here we discuss e¢ ciency in the context of an intertemporal utilitarian
social welfare function. We consider the following planners problem, where
the planner chooses fij()gNi;j=1 in order to maximize the sum of M -workers
and K-workersutility given by (23).
Using (91), (43) and (44), the planners problem is given by:
maxW =
L
   1
Z 1
0
e t  ln(M(t))dt
subject to
_M =   A
=  
NX
k=1
nk
 
kk  +
X
l 6=k
kl G(mdkl;mdlk)
!
_ni = (1  )  ni 
(
ii  + 2
X
j 6=i
ij G(mdij;mdji)
)
+ 
NX
k=1
nk
 
kk  +
X
l 6=k
kl G(mdkl;mdlk)
!
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and
_mdij = (1    )(1 mdij)(1 mdji)
(
ii  +
X
k 6=i;j
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)
)
(97)
 mdij[(1 mdji) 
NX
k=1
kk  nk
ni
+ (1    )  ij 
 
1 mdji
  2G(mdij;mdji)
+     1 mdji NX
k=1
X
l 6=k
kl  nk
ni
G(mdkl;mdlk)]
 mdij  (1    ) 
 
1 mdij
 (jj  +X
k 6=i;j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)
)
given ni (0) > 0 and mdij(0) > 0, for i; j = 1; :::; N . We must also account for
the obvious constraints:
NX
j=1
ij = 1 for each i = 1; :::; N
ij = ji for each i; j = 1; :::; N
ij  0 for each i; j = 1; :::; N
We assume that the discount rate is su¢ ciently large,  > g(mB), in order to
ensure that the objective is nite.
Suppose that the following symmetric initial conditions for case (i-a) are
satised:
ni(0) = n(0) > 0 for i = 1; :::; N
mJ < mdij(0) = m
d(0) < mB for i; j = 1; :::; N , i 6= j
and g(mB) > 
Later, we shall impose two additional symmetry restrictions for some of the
analysis.
Given the same, symmetric initial conditions, we ask: How e¢ cient is the
myopic core path?
For case (i-a), the equilibrium or myopic core path has each knowledge
worker initially working with every other knowledge worker at the same in-
tensity. When the bliss point is attained, the knowledge workers divide into
groups of optimal size, maintaining the bliss point while interacting with only
the knowledge workers in their group:
ij(t) =
1
N   1 for t
J  t < tB for i; j = 1; :::; N , i 6= j (98)
ij(t) =
1
NB   1 for t > t
B when i and j belong to the same group
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where tB is the rst time t such that m(t) = md(t) = mB, the bliss point mB
is given by (54) and the group size NB is given by (83).
Our initial attempts to attack the question of e¢ ciency of the equilibrium
path were naturally based on optimal control methods using Hamiltonians.
However, given that all the dynamics are linear in the control variables ij,
the optimization problem reduces to a singular control programming problem;
we found no existing theorem applicable to our context. Thus, we adopt an
alternative strategy.
We shall divide our discussion into short run e¢ ciency, long run e¢ ciency,
and medium run e¢ ciency. Notice rst that our equilibrium path is in the
myopic core and eventually reaches the bliss point. There are implications
for both short and long run e¢ ciency. First, regarding short term e¢ ciency,
deviation from the myopic core path creates an immediate loss in utility for
all knowledge workers. This means that the equilibrium path cannot be
dominated by another path over all time periods for all workers. Second, the
equilibrium path eventually reaches the bliss point. Since the bliss point has
the highest possible productivity for knowledge workers, the implication is that
the equilibrium or myopic core path weakly overtakes any other path; by this
we mean that there exists an initial time interval after which the equilibrium
path is at least as good as any other path.
The intermediate run is much more di¢ cult to handle. Even in the inter-
mediate run, our myopic core path performs well in terms of e¢ ciency when
the population ofK-workers N is su¢ ciently large. The intuition is as follows.
When md(t) < mB and therefore t < tB, then knowledge productivity is
higher and mdij moves almost as fast to the right as working in isolation if each
person works with every other person with equal intensity. The intuition for
this result follows from a combination of two reasons. First, productivity is
higher when working with others as opposed to working alone on this part of
the path. Second, when N is su¢ ciently large, working with others is very
close to working in isolation when the accumulation of di¤erential knowledge
is considered, so cooperation with others will be better on net. Once the bliss
point is attained, the system reaches the highest productivity possible, and
remains there. This intuition indicates that, when md(t) < mB, working with
a smaller group than the other N   1 dancers results in movement to the right
that is slower than working with everyone but oneself.
Formally, rst we must introduce two additional symmetry restrictions on
paths, aside from the rst restriction to symmetric initial conditions, to provide
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analytical tractability. We also introduce notation for welfare along the myopic
core path when the number of K-workers is given. Then we introduce an
upper limit on the welfare associated with arbitrary feasible paths subject to
the additional symmetry conditions when the number of K-workers becomes
large. Finally we show that whenN is su¢ ciently large, the welfare associated
with the myopic core path approaches the upper limit. Complete details of
the analysis are found in Technical Appendix c.
As promised above, we now introduce an two additional symmetry condi-
tions. In our analysis of e¢ ciency, we restrict attention to pairwise symmetric
paths. If the initial state is pairwise symmetric, we have shown that the
equilibrium path, also called the myopic core path, is pairwise symmetric.
However, in our e¢ ciency analysis, we impose this assumption for tractability
and for the sake of comparison. Thus, we restrict our e¢ ciency analysis to
paths satisfying two additional symmetry restrictions: First, for each knowl-
edge worker i and for every knowledge worker j 6= i,
ni(t) = nj(t)  n(t) for all t
As explained in section 3.1, this is equivalent to
mdij(t) = m
d
ji(t) for all t
Second, at each moment of time, each person interacts with the same number
of people with the same intensity. In other words,
For each K-worker i, there is a subset of K-workers Nai , i =2 Nai and 1  I  0
such that j Nai j= Na  1 for all i,
and for all t < tBs , j 2 Nai =) ij(t) = a 
1  I
Na
where tBs will be dened shortly. An implication is that at each time, each
K-worker spends I fraction of time working in isolation.19 For the myopic
core path, notice that Na = N   1, whereas I = 0.
Dene mdmc to be the path of the myopic core over time with a xed, nite
number of knowledge workers. It satises the additional symmetry condition.
Using (70), this path can be obtained by solving the following di¤erential
19Even when we allow each interaction set Nai (t) to vary with time, we get essentially
the same results below. But such a generalization would complicate the notation and the
arguments. In fact, we permit (but do not require) a change in I and Nai (t) at time tBS in
our analysis.
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equation:
_mdmc =
8<: 2(1 m
d
mc)g(mdmc)
1 C
N
N 1

(N 2) mdmc

(2N 3)+C
2
 N 1
1 C
N

for t<tBmc
0 for ttBmc
with the initial condition mdmc(0) = m
d(0). Here, tBmc is the time when m
d
mc
reaches mB. We dene md1 to be the limit of this path as the number of
knowledge workers tends to innity. Letting N ! 1 in (70), this limiting
path can be obtained by solving the di¤erential equation:
_md1 =
n
(1 md)g(md)f2(1 2md) Cmdg for t<tB1
0 for t>tB1
with the initial condition md1(0) = m
d(0). Here, tB1 is the time when m
d
1
reaches mB. For an arbitrary path satisfying all of the symmetry conditions,
dene mda to be the time path for active partners for knowledge worker i,
namely members of Nai , whereas mds is dened to the the time path for shadow
partners for knowledge worker i, namely knowledge workers who are not mem-
bers of Nai . In fact, an arbitrary feasible path satisfying all of our symmetry
conditions is a pair mdf = (m
d
a;m
d
s). Dene t
B
s to be the time at which the
path for shadow partners mds reaches the bliss point m
B. At time tBs , we allow
the K-workers to choose any new 0I and Na0i (possibly the same as I and Nai )
satisfying all the symmetry conditions. For the precise derivation of the three
time paths mda, m
d
s, and m
d
f , please refer to Technical Appendix c.
The general relationship of these paths is depicted in Figure 6, with time
t on the horizontal axis and the percent of ideas md exclusive to a knowledge
worker in a partnership on the vertical axis.
FIGURE 6 GOES HERE
Proposition 3: For every feasible path mdf = (m
d
a;m
d
s) satisfying all of
the symmetry conditions, for all times 0 < t < tBs ,
md1(t) > m
d
s(t) > m
d
a(t)
The proof can be found in Lemmas 2 and 3 of Technical Appendix c.
The intuition for the result is as follows. At time zero for case (i-a), K-
workers are too homogeneous relative to the bliss point. Thus, building up
heterogeneity is important. Given the symmetry assumptions, the choice of
feasible paths is equivalent to the choice of how many partners K-workers
have, and how much time each K-worker spends on research alone. For
39
active partners, heterogeneity builds up slowly, since active partners create
knowledge in common. For shadow partners, heterogeneity builds up more
quickly, since the partnerships are not active and thus potential partners are
creating di¤erent ideas. Finally, on the myopic core path each K-worker is
interacting with the maximal number of partners. If N is large, the path
displays the advantages of working with shadow partners, since time spent
interacting with any given partner is small, but still has joint production of
ideas to maximize knowledge growth, di¤erentiating K-workers quickly.
For a xed population of K-workers N , we dene the levels of welfare gen-
erated by three di¤erent paths. Let W1(N) be the level of welfare generated
by the md1 path, but for knowledge worker population size N .
20 Typically,
this path is not feasible, but it is a useful construction. Let Wf (N) be the
level of welfare generated by the mdf path for the same population size N . By
Lemma 4 of Technical Appendix c, it follows that
W1(N) > Wf (N)
Therefore we can conclude that for each xed population of K-workers N ,
the limiting myopic core growth pattern gives an upper bound on the welfare
generated by any feasible growth path satisfying the symmetry conditions. The
intuition for this result is as follows. Since K-productivity is higher as md
moves from the left toward the bliss point mB, and since Proposition 3 implies
that the md1 path reaches m
B faster than any other feasible path, the welfare
associated with the md1 path is naturally greater than the welfare associated
with any other feasible path.
Now that we have an upper bound on the welfare generated by an arbitrary
path with N knowledge workers, we can examine how the myopic core or
equilibrium path performs relative to these alternative paths. Let Wmc(N)
be the level of welfare generated by the myopic core path with N knowledge
workers.
Proposition 4: As the number of knowledge workers N tends to innity,
the di¤erence in welfare corresponding to the myopic core path and the welfare
corresponding to the limiting myopic core path monotonically converges to 0:
lim
N!1
fW1(N) Wmc(N)g = 0
20By denition, the md1 path itself is independent of N . However, as shown in Technical
Appendix c, the welfare generated by md1 under a given value of population N is a function
of N since the volume of new ideas created in the economy at each time is dependent on N .
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The proof can be found in Lemma 5 of Technical Appendix c. The intuition
for this surprising result is as follows. By denition, W1(N) represents the
welfare generated by following the limit of the myopic core pairwise knowledge
di¤erential paths as the number ofK-workers tends to innity, but evaluated in
terms of knowledge production when the number of knowledge workers is nite.
This path is an upper bound on all feasible paths, but is not itself feasible for
nite populations of K-workers. In contrast, Wmc(N) is the actual welfare
generated by the myopic core path with N knowledge workers. Although
limN!1W1(N) and limN!1Wmc(N) are generally innite, their di¤erence
converges to zero for the following reason. The actual paths of pairwise
knowledge di¤erentials for the nite and innite population cases converge, so
the only di¤erence in welfare is due to the di¤erence in how population a¤ects
knowledge production along these given paths. The e¤ect is proportional to
knowledge worker population in either case, so the logarithmic form of welfare
implied by the model means that this di¤erence is actually zero for all N .
We conclude that for large populations of knowledge workersN , our equilib-
rium or myopic core path performs well with respect to welfare in comparison
with arbitrary paths satisfying the symmetry conditions.
6 Conjectures and Conclusions
We have considered a model of knowledge creation and economic growth that
is based on individual behavior, allowing knowledge workers to decide whether
joint or individual production is best for them at any given time. We have
allowed them to choose their best partner or to work in isolation. One would
not expect that equilibria would be e¢ cient for three reasons: R & D work-
ers are myopic in their work choices, there are externalities in R & D (both
from pairwise interactions and from public knowledge transmission through
patents), and the markets for consumption goods are characterized by mo-
nopolistic competition. The emphasis of our model is on endogenous agent
heterogeneity, whereas we examine the permanent e¤ects of knowledge creation
and accumulation on growth.
With N persons, assuming that N is large enough, we nd that, surpris-
ingly, for a range of initial conditions that imply a large degree of homogeneity
among agents, the sink is the most productive state in the R & D sector. The
population breaks into optimal size groups when it reaches the most produc-
tive state. The size of these groups is inversely related to the weight given to
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homogeneity in knowledge production.
Our equilibrium performs well in e¢ ciency tests, subject to the constraint
that the market for consumption goods features monopolistic competition.
Long run economic growth is positively related to both the e¤ectiveness
of pairwise knowledge worker interaction and, more importantly, to the ef-
fectiveness of public knowledge transmission. The latter is due, in part, to
the endogenous adjustment of R & D group size to a better public knowledge
transmission technology.
In applying our results to real life issues, we must be very careful about
interpreting the meaning of the comparative dynamics that we have derived.
According to equation (84), for example, the optimal group size eNB increases
as C (the speed of public knowledge transmission) increases or  (the weight
given to knowledge in common in K-production) decreases. In real life, how-
ever, once the optimal group size is reached under a xed set of parameters,
group size does not easily adjust to a new optimal size under a new set of
parameters. This is because of the lock-in e¤ect of the optimal group size
that was explained at the end of Case (i-a) in Section 3.2.1. In particular, the
knowledge of a K-worker in one group will drift apart from the knowledge of
K-workers in other groups. Thus, once the most productive state is achieved
under one set of parameters, realigning the K-workers into larger groups when
parameters change will not result in optimal knowledge production, since the
K-workers initially in di¤erent groups have di¤erentiated themselves too much
from each other. This lock-in e¤ect inherent in an R & D system may partly
explain, for example, why the Japanese economy has been su¤ering from a
prolonged recession and slow growth since the early 1990s. Specically, the
so called IT revolution has signicantly increased the value of C, whereas new
industries displaying rapid growth, such as computer software and advanced
service industries (including global nance), tend to have a lower value of
 (i.e., a higher weight on knowledge diversity in K-production) than tradi-
tional manufacturing industries (based mainly on incremental improvements
in Japan). Due to the lock-in e¤ect, R & D group size and composition were
inherited from past economic circumstances. Our model implies low mobility
of Japanese workers and researchers beyond existing institutions, through no
fault of their own. But the Japanese R & D system has not adapted ade-
quately to the new situation. Our analysis implies that research groups in
the new industries should be made more diverse and larger. Such a change
would generate short term reductions in R & D productivity in exchange for
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long term gains.
Many extensions of our work come to mind. It is important and inter-
esting to add direct pairwise knowledge transfer between knowledge workers
on a team, as opposed to public knowledge that is learned by everyone, to
the model. Then we can study comparative statics with respect to speeds of
knowledge transfer and knowledge creation on the equilibrium outcome and
on its e¢ ciency. One set of extensions would allow agents to decide, in addi-
tion to the people they choose with whom to work, the intensity of knowledge
creation and exchange.
Another set of extensions would be to add stochastic elements to the model,
so the knowledge creation and transfer process is not deterministic. Probably
our framework can be developed from a more primitive stochastic model, where
the law of large numbers is applied to obtain our framework as a reduced
form.21
An important application of our work would be to the literature on intel-
lectual property, where the idea production process is often modeled as a black
box; see Scotchmer (2004) and Boldrin and Levine (2005) for interesting and
provocative treatments.
Location seems to be an important feature of knowledge creation and trans-
fer, so regions and migration are important, along with urban economic con-
cepts more generally; for example, see Duranton and Puga (2001) and Helsley
and Strange (2004). A natural extension of our model would have knowledge
workers in regions, allowing only those in the same region to interact, but
making migration of knowledge workers between regions feasible.
It would be very useful to extend the model to more general functional
forms. It would be interesting to proceed in the opposite direction by putting
more structure on our concept of knowledge, allowing asymmetry or intro-
ducing notions of distance, such as a metric, on the set of ideas22 or on the
space of knowledge. Finally, it would be useful to add vertical di¤erentiation
of knowledge, as in Jovanovic and Rob (1989), to our model of horizontally
di¤erentiated knowledge.
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Figure 1: The g(m) curve and the bliss point when 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Figure 2: Possible meetings when N = 4.
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Figure 3: The K-productivity curve g(m) and the limiting sink curve emd.
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7 Appendix 1
7.1 Justication of Knowledge Absorption Function
Consider the following statement of the capacity constraint on knowledge ab-
sorption from public information on K-worker i:
C 
 
ii  aii +
X
j 6=i
ij  (aij=2)
!
= 
 
A 
NX
j=1
ij  aij
!
(99)
We shall explain the content of this equation piece by piece. On the right hand
side of the equation, the term in brackets A PNj=1 ij  aij represents the new
knowledge produced in the economy that does not involve partnerships includ-
ing K-worker i. Recall that  gives the rate at which new ideas are patented,
whereas  gives the rate at which publicly revealed ideas can be absorbed by a
K-worker. Therefore the right hand side of the equation represents the public
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knowledge revealed by patents that is absorbed by K-worker i. The term in
brackets on the left hand side represents new knowledge created by K-worker
i at an instant. In total, the equation means that the new public knowledge
that can be absorbed by K-worker i is proportional to their capacity to pro-
duce new ideas. In essence, this is due to the constraint on their time and the
productivity of their e¤ort both to absorb new ideas and to produce them.
Equation (99) implies:
 =
C

 ii  aii +
P
j 6=i ij  (aij=2)
A PNj=1 ij  aij
Next we consider two special cases, where we assume pairwise symmetry:
nk = ni  n for all i and k. First, when each agent in the knowledge sector
is working alone, namely ii = 1 for all i and ij = 0 for all i 6= j, then
A =
NX
k=1
  nk =   n N
and
 =
C

   n
  n  (N   1) =
C

 1
N   1
The second special case is given by mdij = m
d for all i 6= j and g(md) > .
Thus, ii = 0 for all i and aij = a for all i 6= j. In this special case, we have
 =
C

 a=2
Na
2
  a =
C

 1
N   2
Assuming N is su¢ ciently large, we employ the following specication.
(N)  C
N
7.2 Case (iii): mB < md(0)
Let us consider the dynamics of the system when it begins to the right of
mB. First we consider the situation where mB < md(0) < mI , where mI
was introduced in Figure 1. In other words, the initial state reects a higher
degree of heterogeneity than the bliss point, but g(md(0)) > . Since the
initial state reects a higher degree of heterogeneity than the bliss point, the
K-workers want to increase the knowledge they have in common as fast as
possible, leading to delity and pairwise knowledge creation.
To be precise, since mdij(0) = m
d(0) for all i 6= j and g(md(0)) > , the
situation at time 0 is the same as that in Case (i) except that we now have
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md(0) > mB. Hence, focusing on person i as before, the time derivative of
income yi at time 0 is given by (67). However, since g0(md) = g0(md(0)) < 0 at
time 0, in order to maximize the right hand side of equation (67), person i now
must solve now the following quadratic maximization problem:
max
X
j 6=i
2ij subject to
X
j 6=i
ij = 1 (100)
Thus, person i wishes to choose any partner, say k, and set ik = 1, whereas
ij = 0 for all j 6= k. The situation is the same for all K-workers. Hence,
without loss of generality, we can assume that N persons agree at time 0 to
form the following combination of partnerships:
P1  ff1; 2g ; f3; 4g f5; 6g ;    ; fN   1; Ngg (101)
and initiate a pairwise knowledge creation work pattern such that23
ij = ji = 1 for fi; jg 2 P1, ij = ji = 0 for fi; jg =2 P1 (102)
Similar to Berliant and Fujita (forthcoming, case (ii)), the equilibrium path
can be described as follows. The equilibrium path consists of several phases.
First, in order to increase income and K-productivity as fast as possible, the
K-workers want to develop knowledge in common with their partner as fast as
possible. Therefore, the N persons are paired arbitrarily and work with their
partners for a nonempty interval of time. This implies fast movement to the
left, because there is both shared knowledge creation and public knowledge
transfer. If potential partners are not actually meeting, their di¤erential
knowledge will converge to the sink point of the process where no persons
meet, given by (87) and illustrated by md1 in Figure 3. This process moves to
the left beyond the bliss point because K-workers cannot switch to any new
partner that will allow them to maintain the bliss point. The actual partners
move quickly to the left of the bliss point and their K-productivity decreases
rapidly. When their productivity matches that of a potential partner with
whom they have not worked, they switch to new partners and work with their
new partners for a nonempty interval of time. Once again, the two actual
partners increase their knowledge in common quickly, past the bliss point,
and their productivity decreases rapidly, while the di¤erential knowledge with
their potential partners moves slowly toward md, until the productivity of
23Here we adopt the convention that fi; jg 2 P1 means either fi; jg 2 P1 or fj; ig 2 P1,
whereas fi; jg =2 P1 means neither fi; jg 2 P1 nor fj; ig 2 P1.
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their current partnership and their previous partnership are the same. Next,
each person works alternately with the two partners with whom they worked in
the rst two phases, but not with a person with whom they have not worked
previously. This process continues, but the productivity of each K-worker
oscillates between g(md1 ) and g(m
B). The equilibrium path in this case
crosses the bliss point, but this is not a sink of the process, due to the myopic
behavior of the K-workers.
8 Appendix 2: Technical Appendix
8.1 Appendix a
Theorem A1: The following identity holds for i 6= j:
aij=2
ni
= G(mdij;m
d
ji)
where G is dened in (35).
Proof: Using (26) and (33),
aij=2
ni
=
nij
ni
 aij=2
nij
=
1
1 mdji
 (mcij)  (mdij mdji)
1 
2
=

 
1 mdij  mdji
  (mdij mdji) 1 2
1 mdji
= G(mdij;m
d
ji)
which leads to (34).
Theorem A2: Knowledge dynamics evolve according to the system:
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_mdij = (1    )(1 mdij)(1 mdji)
(
ii  +
X
k 6=i;j
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)
)
 mdij[(1 mdji) 
NX
k=1
kk  nk
ni
+ (1    )  ij 
 
1 mdji
  2G(mdij;mdji)
+     1 mdji NX
k=1
X
l 6=k
kl  nk
ni
G(mdkl;mdlk)]
 mdij  (1    ) 
 
1 mdij
 (jj  +X
k 6=i;j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)
)
for i; j = 1; 2;    ; N , i 6= j
Proof: By denition,
_mdij =
d
 
ndij=n
ij

dt
=
_ndij
nij
  n
d
ij
nij
 _n
ij
nij
=
_ndij
nij
 mdij 
_nij
nij
=
_ndij
nij
 mdij 
 
_ncij
nij
+
_ndij
nij
+
_ndji
nij
!
=
 
1 mdij
  _ndij
nij
 mdij 
 
_ncij
nij
+
_ndji
nij
!
Setting  = (N), and using (42) and (33), we have
_ndij
nij
=
(1    )  P
k 6=j
ik  aik
nij
= (1    )  [ii    ni
nij
+
X
k 6=i;j
ik  aik
nij
]
= (1    )  [ii    ni
nij
+
X
k 6=i;j
ik  ni
nij
 n
ik
ni
 aik
nik
]
= (1    )  ni
nij

(
ii  +
X
k 6=i;j
ik  n
ik
ni
 aik
nik
)
= (1    )   1 mdji 
(
ii  +
X
k 6=i;j
ik  1
1 mdki
 2  1 mdik  mdki  (mdik mdki) 1 2
)
= (1    )   1 mdji 
(
ii  +
X
k 6=i;j
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)
)
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Similarly,
_ndji
nij
= (1    )   1 mdij 
(
jj  +
X
k 6=i;j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)
)
while using (41) yields
_ncij
nij
=
(1    )ij  aij +   A
nij
=
(1    )ij  aij +    
PN
k=1 kk  akk +    
PN
k=1
P
l 6=k kl  (akl=2)
nij
=
   PNk=1 kk  akk
nij
+
(1    )  ij  aij
nij
+
   PNk=1Pl 6=k kl  (akl=2)
nij
Using equations (25), (26), (34), and (33), we have:
_ncij
nij
=       (1 mdji) 
NX
k=1
kk  nk
ni
+ (1    )  ij  2 
 
1 mdij  mdji
  (mdij mdji) 1 2
+   
NX
k=1
X
l 6=k
kl  n
kl
nij
    1 mdkl  mdlk  (mdkl mdlk) 1 2
=       (1 mdji) 
NX
k=1
kk  nk
ni
+ (1    )  ij  (1 mdji)  2G(mdij;mdji)
+   
NX
k=1
X
l 6=k
kl  nk
ni
 (1 mdji) G
 
mdkl;m
d
lk

Thus,
_mdij = (1    )(1 mdij)(1 mdji)
(
ii  +
X
k 6=i;j
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)
)
 mdij[(1 mdji) 
NX
k=1
kk  nk
ni
+ (1    )  ij 
 
1 mdji
  2G(mdij;mdji)
+     1 mdji NX
k=1
X
l 6=k
kl  nk
ni
G(mdkl;mdlk)]
 mdij  (1    ) 
 
1 mdij
 (jj  +X
k 6=i;j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)
)
8.2 Appendix b
Here we conrm that when the expenditure of any specic consumer i is con-
stant over time and given by (20), the total equilibrium expenditure in the
economy is indeed given by equation (18).
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For case (i-a), along the equilibrium path, the present value of income at
time 0 for K-worker i is given by
Wi(0) =
Z 1
0
e tyi(t)dt
=
Z 1
0
e t  [  a(t)
2
 (t)]dt
Furthermore, as explained in case (i-a) of the Growth section,
_M =   A(t) =  N  a(t)
2
Thus,
Wi(0) =
1
N
Z 1
0
e t  _M(t)  (t)dt (103)
where the patent price (t) is obtained as follows, by using (15) and (16):
(t) =
Z 1
t
e ( t)  ()d
=
Z 1
t
e ( t)  q
()
   1d
=
L
   1 
Z 1
t
e ( t)  1
M()
d (104)
that yields
_(t) = (t)  L
   1 
1
M(t)
(105)
Next, integrating (103) by parts and using (105), we obtain:
Wi(0) =
1
N
Z 1
0
_M(t)  (e t  (t))dt
=
1
N

e t M(t)  (t) j10  Z 1
0
M(t)  d(e
 t  (t))
dt
dt

=
1
N

e t M(t)  (t) j10  Z 1
0
M(t)  ( e t  (t) + e t  _(t))dt

=
1
N

e t M(t)  (t) j10 + Z 1
0
M(t)  e t  (t)dt 
Z 1
0
e t M(t)  _(t))dt

=
1
N
fe t M(t)  (t) j10 + Z 1
0
e t M(t)  (t)dt
 
Z 1
0
e t  (M(t)  (t)  L
   1)dtg
=
1
N

e t M(t)  (t) j10 +Z 1
0
e t  L
   1dt

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that leads to
Wi(0) =
1
N

lim
t!1
e t M(t)  (t) M(0)  (0) + L
   1 
1


Thus, using (20) and (8), for any specic K-worker i, expenditure is:
Ei = 

(0) M(0)
N
+Wi(0)

=
1
N

  lim
t!1
e t M(t)  (t) + L
   1

In order to evaluate the rst term in this expression, observe that by (104),
M(t)  (t) = L
   1 
Z 1
t
e ( t)  M(t)
M()
d
<
L
   1 
Z 1
t
e ( t)d =
L
   1 
1

The second line follows since for  > t, M(t)
M()
< 1. So
lim
t!1
e t M(t)  (t) = 0 (106)
and
Ei =
1
N
 L
   1
Therefore, the total expenditure of all K-workers together is:
N  Ei = L
   1 (107)
For any specic M -worker i, we have yi(t) = wM  1 for every time t.
Thus,
Wi(0) =
Z 1
0
e t  yi(t)dt = 1

Noting that !i = 0 by assumption for any M -worker, equation (20) yields:
Ei = 1
So the total expenditure of all M -workers together is:
L  Ei = L (108)
Summing (107) and (108) yields the total expenditure of consumers in the
economy:
E =
L
   1 + L =
L
   1 =
L

(109)
Therefore relation (18) is veried for the equilibrium path.
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8.3 Appendix c
Here we discuss e¢ ciency in the context of an intertemporal utilitarian social
welfare function. We consider the following planners problem, where the
planner chooses fij()gNi;j=1 in order to maximize the sum of M -workersand
K-workersutility given by (23).
Using (91), (43) and (44), the planners problem is given by:
Choose piecewise continuous fij(t)g for i; j = 1; :::; N and t  0 so as to
maxW =
L
   1
Z 1
0
e t  ln(M(t))dt (110)
subject to
_M =   A
=  
NX
k=1
nk
 
kk  +
X
l 6=k
kl G(mdkl;mdlk)
!
_ni = (1  )  ni 
(
ii  + 2
X
j 6=i
ij G(mdij;mdji)
)
+ 
NX
k=1
nk
 
kk  +
X
l 6=k
kl G(mdkl;mdlk)
!
and
_mdij = (1    )(1 mdij)(1 mdji)
(
ii  +
X
k 6=i;j
ik  2G(mdik;mdki)
)
 mdij[(1 mdji) 
NX
k=1
kk  nk
ni
+ (1    )  ij 
 
1 mdji
  2G(mdij;mdji)
+     1 mdji NX
k=1
X
l 6=k
kl  nk
ni
G(mdkl;mdlk)]
 mdij  (1    ) 
 
1 mdij
 (jj  +X
k 6=i;j
jk  2G(mdjk;mdkj)
)
given ni (0) > 0 and mdij(0) > 0, for i; j = 1; :::; N . The equality in the
objective function follows from (22) and (109). We must also account for the
obvious constraints:
NX
j=1
ij = 1 for each i = 1; :::; N
ij = ji for each i; j = 1; :::; N
ij  0 for each i; j = 1; :::; N
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We assume that the discount rate is su¢ ciently large,  > g(mB), in order to
ensure that the objective is nite.
We assume symmetric initial conditions,
ni (0) = nj(0) = n(0) > 0 for i; j = 1; :::; N: (111)
that implies
mdij(0) = m
d
ji(0)  md(0) > 0 for i; j = 1; :::; N: (112)
Given our welfare function in equation (110), choosing fijg to maximize
total income at a given time t, namely choosing the myopic core path, yields a
growth path that is not dominated in the very short run. In the long run, our
myopic core path reaches the bliss point in nite time; the bliss point is the
maximal productivity for any path. Thus, after a certain interval of time, our
myopic core path weakly overtakes any other path, in the sense that after this
initial interval of time, the payo¤s from the myopic core path are at least as
high as those from any other path. Next, we focus on the intermediate run,
the time intervals not covered by the short and long run cases.
To study the intermediate run, our analysis proceeds as follows. First,
in Lemma 1, we shall compute the rate of increase in di¤erential knowledge
for pairs of K-workers, given the initial conditions for case (i-a), (115), for
our limiting myopic core path as the number of K-workers tends to innity.
Lemmas 2 and 3 show that this rate of increase dominates that of any alter-
native path from time 0 until the bliss point is attained, provided that the
alternative path satises two further symmetry conditions. We conclude from
the rst three lemmas that for any alternative feasible path satisfying the ad-
ditional symmetry conditions, if the number of K-workers is su¢ ciently large,
our limiting myopic core path will dominate it in terms of the rate of increase
of di¤erential knowledge. This is depicted in Figure 6. Lemma 4 shows that
an improvement in the rate of increase of di¤erential knowledge has a posi-
tive impact on the paths of patent and idea production. Thus, the limiting
myopic core path provides an upper bound on welfare achievable by any al-
ternative feasible path satisfying the symmetry conditions. Finally, Lemma
5 shows that the di¤erence between the welfare level generated by our myopic
core path and our limiting myopic core path tends to zero as the number of
knowledge workers tends to innity, thus demonstrating that our myopic core
path is asymptotically e¢ cient as the number of knowledge workers tends to
innity.
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When md(t) < mB, then knowledge productivity is higher and mdij moves
almost as fast to the right as working in isolation if each person works with
every other person with equal intensity. The intuition for this result follows
from a combination of two reasons. First, productivity is higher when working
with others as opposed to working alone on this part of the path. Second, when
N is su¢ ciently large, working with others is very close to working in isolation
when the accumulation of di¤erential knowledge is considered, so cooperation
with others will be better on net. Once the bliss point is attained, the system
reaches the highest productivity possible, and remains there. This intuition
indicates that, whenmd(t) < mB, working with a smaller group than the other
N   1 K-workers results in movement to the right that is slower than working
with everyone but oneself.
Here we introduce symmetry of the admissible paths, a second symmetry
restriction after the restriction to symmetric initial conditions. In our analy-
sis of e¢ ciency, we restrict attention to pairwise symmetric paths. If the
initial state is pairwise symmetric, then the equilibrium is pairwise symmetric.
However, in our e¢ ciency analysis, we impose this assumption for tractability.
Later, we shall impose a third symmetry restriction for some of the analysis.
For tractability and the sake of comparison with the equilibrium path, we
restrict our e¢ ciency analysis to paths satisfying the symmetry restriction:
For each knowledge worker i and for every knowledge worker j 6= i,
ni(t) = nj(t)  n(t) for all t (113)
As explained in section 3.1, this is equivalent to
mdij(t) = m
d
ji(t) for all t (114)
Furthermore, we focus on case (i-a), namely when the initial heterogeneity is
to the left of the bliss point and where the public knowledge externality is not
too strong:
mJ < md(0)  mB and C < eC: (115)
Using these restrictions and (58), we can restate the optimization problem
in a simpler fashion: Maximize
W =
L
   1
Z 1
0
e t  ln(M)dt (116)
subject to
_M =   A
=  
NX
k=1
ni
(
kk  +
X
l 6=k
kl  g(mdkl)
)
(117)
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_ni =

1  C
N

 ni 
(
ii  + 2
X
j 6=i
ij  g(mdij)
)
(118)
+
C
N

NX
k=1
nk
(
kk  +
X
l 6=k
kl  g(mdkl)
)
and
_mdij = (1 
C
N
)(1 mdij)(1 mdij)
(
ii  +
X
k 6=i;j
ik  2g(mdik)
)
(119)
 mdij[
C
N
 (1 mdij) 
NX
k=1
kk + (1  C
N
)  ij 
 
1 mdij
  2g(mdij)
+
C
N
  1 mdij NX
k=1
X
l 6=k
kl  g(mdkl)]
 mdij  (1 
C
N
)   1 mdij 
(
jj  +
X
k 6=i;j
jk  2g(mdjk)
)
subject to initial conditions (111) and (112) as well as symmetry conditions
(113) and (114) under the obvious restrictions on the control variables.
Using (27) and (38), we obtain
NX
i=1
yi = A
On the equilibrium path, each K-worker takes the patent price  as given.
Hence
max
NX
i=1
yi , max _M = A
Lemma 1: For case (i-a), on the myopic core path, for each xed md, the
value of _md given by equation (70) is increasing in the number of K-workers,
N . Moreover, along the myopic core path,
lim
N!1
_md  _md1 = 2(1 md)  g(md)  f1 md[2 +
C
2
]g (120)
= (1 md)  g(md)  f2(1  2md)  Cmdg
Proof: Inspecting equation (70), for xed md the expression on the right
hand side is increasing in N . Taking the limit of equation (70) as N tends to
innity yields the second result.
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Solving the di¤erential equation (120) using initial conditions (112), we
dene the tB1 to be the time when the limiting myopic core path reaches the
bliss point, namely
md1(t
B
1) = m
B
When the limiting myopic core path reachesmB, we assume that theK-workers
split into groups of optimal size eNB given by (84), and stay at the bliss point
mB. Hence we set
md1(t) = m
B for t  tB1
The top curve in Figure 6 depicts the limiting myopic core path.
As promised above, we now introduce a third symmetry condition. At
each moment of time, each person interacts with the same number of people
with the same intensity. In other words,
For each K-worker i, there is a subset of K-workers Nai , i =2 Nai and 1  I  0
(121)
such that j Nai j= Na  1 for all i,
and for all t < tBs , j 2 Nai =) ij(t) = a 
1  I
Na
where tBs will be dened shortly. An implication is that at each time, each
K-worker spends I fraction of time working in isolation.
For the myopic core path, notice that Na = N   1, whereas I = 0. So for
admissible alternative paths, K-workers can form smaller subgroups or work
in isolation.
Next, in preparation for Lemma 2, we perform some preliminary calcula-
tions of path dynamics for the active and shadow partners. With a focus on
K-worker i and potential partner j, we calculate the dynamics of _mdij when i
and j are active partners, namely j 2 Nai . Since all active pairs are symmetric,
we have
mdij(t) = m
d
ji(t)  mda(t) for each j 2 Nai , (122)
for all i = 1; 2; :::; N and for all t
mdij(t) = m
d
ji(t)  mds(t) for each j =2 Nai ,
for all i = 1; 2; :::; N and for all t
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In (119), using (122), setting kk = I for all k = 1; :::; N , we set
ij(t) =
1  I
Na
when j 2 Nai
ik(t) =
1  I
Na
when k 2 Nai
kl(t) =
1  I
Na
when l 2 Nak
Then for active partner j 2 Nai , setting mdij = mda, we obtain
_mda
1 mda
= (1  C
N
)(1 mda)

I  + 2g(mda)(1  I   a)
	
 mda[C    I + (1 
C
N
)  2g(mda)a
+C  g(mda)  (1  I)]
 mda  (1 
C
N
)  I  + 2g(mda)(1  I   a)	
= f2(1  C
N
)(1  2mda)  Cmdag  g(mda)  (1  I) (123)
+f(1  C
N
)(1  2mda)  Cmdag  I   (1 
C
N
)  (1 mda)  2g(mda)  a
whereas for shadow partner j =2 Nai , setting mdij = mds
_mds
1 mds
= (1  C
N
)(1 mds)

I  + 2g(mda)(1  I)
	
 mds[C    I + C  g(mda)(1  I)]
 mds  (1 
C
N
)  I  + 2g(mda)(1  I)	
= f2(1  C
N
)(1  2mds)  Cmdsg  g(mda)  (1  I) (124)
+f(1  C
N
)(1  2mds)  Cmdsg  I
Solving this system of di¤erential equations (123) and (124) using initial con-
ditions (112), we obtain the active path, mda, and the shadow path, m
d
s. Then
we dene the tBs to be the time when the shadow path reaches the bliss point,
namely24
mds(t
B
s ) = m
B
24If the bliss point is not attained by the shadow path in nite time, then set tBs =1.
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Lemma 2: Under the additional symmetry condition (121), mds(t) >
mda(t) for all 0 < t < t
B
s .
Proof: From the initial condition (112), mds(0) = m
d
a(0) = m
d(0). Thus,
using (123) and (124)
_mds(0)  _mda(0) = (1 
C
N
)  (1 mda)  2g(mda)  a
that is positive by assumption. Thus, at least for small t, mds(t) > m
d
a(t).
Next, we show by contradiction that this relationship holds for all t > 0.
Suppose to the contrary, at time t that mds(t)  mda(t). Then by continuity of
the active and shadow paths, there is some minimal time 0 < t0 < t such that
mds(t
0) = mda(t
0). Then using (123) and (124), we have that at time t0
_mds(t
0)  _mda(t0) = (1 
C
N
)  (1 mda)  2g(mda)  a
that is positive again by assumption. This results in a contradiction, because
mds(t
0) = mda(t
0) and _mds(t
0) > _mda(t
0) mean that there is a 0 < bt < t0 where
mds(bt) = mda(bt).
Next we show that the path representing shadow partners,mds, is dominated
by the limiting myopic path md1, as illustrated in Figure 6.
Lemma 3: For all 0 < t < tBs ,
_md1(t
0) > _mds(t) whenever m
d
1(t
0) = mds(t) (125)
implying that
md1(t) > m
d
s(t) for all 0 < t < t
B
s
Proof: When md1(t
0) = mds(t)  md, using (120) and (124)
_md1(t
0)  _mds(t)
1 md = f2(1  2m
d)  Cmdg  g(md) (126)
 f2(1  C
N
)(1  2md)  Cmdg  g(mda(t))  (1  I)
 f(1  C
N
)(1  2md)  Cmdg  I
By Lemma 2, mB > md(t) > mda(t) for all 0 < t < t
B
s . When I = 0,
_md1(t
0)  _mds(t)
1 md = f2(1  2m
d)  Cmdg  g(md)
 f2(1  C
N
)(1  2md)  Cmdg  g(mda(t))
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Since g(md(t)) > g(mda(t)), we can readily conclude that _m
d
1(t
0) > _mds(t).
When I = 1,
_md1(t
0)  _mds(t)
1 md = f2(1  2m
d)  Cmdg  g(md)
 f(1  C
N
)(1  2md)  Cmdg
By assumption, g(md) > , and hence we can conclude that _md1(t
0) > _mds(t).
By the linearity of (126), we can conclude that (125) holds for all 0 < t < tBs .
Given the same initial conditions for the two di¤erential equations, the result
is proved.
Combining Lemmas 2 and 3, we have the situation depicted in Figure 6.
For any 0 < t < tBs , the limiting myopic core path m
d
1 strictly dominates the
shadow path mds, which in turn strictly dominates the active path m
d
a.
Fixing I and Nai , we have obtained the growth path (mda;mds) for 0 <
t < tBs . In fact, they act in concert, generating a growth pattern for both
the active and shadow partners. Beyond tBs , we consider two alternative
symmetric growth patterns. At time tBs , we allow the K-workers to choose
any new 0I and Na0i (possibly the same as I and Nai ) satisfying (121). We solve
the di¤erential equations (123) and (124) as before, with initial conditions
j 2 Nai ) mdij(tBs ) = mda(tBs )
j =2 Nai ) mdij(tBs ) = mds(tBs ) = mB
Analogous to previous notation, we denote the associated growth path by
(mdfa ;m
df
s ) for t  tBs . We denote by mdf = (mdfa ;mdfs ) the growth pattern that
follows (mda;m
d
s) for 0 < t < t
B
s and (m
df
a ;m
df
s ) for t  tBs , that is by denition
feasible. By varying 0I and Na0i , we can obtain many growth patterns. Next
we establish an upper bound on all such growth patterns. Dene this upper
bound, called md, by
mdij(t) = m
d
a if j 2 Nai , mdij(t) = mds if j =2 Nai for 0 < t < tBs
mdij(t) = m
d(t) = mB for all i; j = 1; 2; :::; N and for all t  tBs
This path might not be feasible after time tBs , but it nevertheless establishes
an upper bound on feasible paths.
Now we have three alternative growth patterns: md1, m
d, and an arbitrary
feasible path, mdf . By comparing the welfare generated by each of the three
growth patterns, we can readily conclude as follows.
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Lemma 4: The limiting myopic core growth pattern gives an upper bound
on the patent and idea paths generated by any feasible growth pattern. More
precisely,
_M(t) j md1 > _M(t) jmd _M(t) jmdf for 0 < t < t
B
s
_M(t) j md1 = _M(t) jmd _M(t) jmdf for t > t
B
s (127)
_ni(t) j md1 > _ni(t) jmd _ni(t) jmdf for all i = 1; 2; :::; N; for all 0 < t < t
B
s
_ni(t) j md1 > _ni(t) jmd _ni(t) jmdf for all i = 1; 2; :::; N; for all t > t
B
s
Proof: In equation (117), we focus on the terms in parentheses, evaluating
them before and after time tBs : for all k = 1; 2; :::; N; for all 0 < t < t
B
s ,
kk(t)  +
X
l 6=k
kl(t)  g(mdkl(t)) jmd1= g(md1(t))
> g(mda(t)) = kk(t)  +
X
l 6=k
kl(t)  g(mdkl(t)) jmd
= kk(t)  +
X
l 6=k
kl(t)  g(mdkl(t)) jmdf
For all k = 1; 2; :::; N; for all t  tBs ,
kk(t)  +
X
l 6=k
kl(t)  g(mdkl(t)) jmd1= g(mB)
= kk(t)  +
X
l 6=k
kl(t)  g(mdkl(t)) jmd
 kk(t)  +
X
l 6=k
kl(t)  g(mdkl(t)) jmdf
For the terms in both parentheses in equation (118), we obtain an analogous
result. Thus, by the nature of the di¤erential equations (117) and (118), the
four lines of the relationship (127) follow.
Next we outline our strategy for the remainder of the analysis. First, for a
xed population of K-workers N , we dene the levels of welfare generated by
three di¤erent paths. LetW1(N) be the level of welfare generated by the md1
path, but for population size N . Let W (N) be the level of welfare generated
by the md path for the same population size N . Finally, let Wf (N) be the
level of welfare generated by the mdf path for the same population size N . By
Lemma 4, it is clear that
W1(N) > W (N) > Wf (N)
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Therefore we can conclude that for each xed population of K-workers N ,
the limiting myopic core growth pattern gives an upper bound on the welfare
generated by any feasible growth pattern.
LetWmc(N) be the level of welfare generated by the myopic core path with
N K-workers. It remains for us to show that:
lim
N!1
fW1(N) Wmc(N)g = 0
To accomplish this task, we must dene Wmc(N) and W1(N) formally. After
that, the result follows almost immediately.
First, recalling (70) and applying (116) to (119) to the case of the myopic
core path, Wmc(N) is dened as follows:
Wmc(N)  L


Z 1
0
e t ln[Mmc(t)]dt
where
_Mmc =   nmc  g(mdmc) N (128)
_nmc = nmc  g(mdmc)  n  (2 +
N   2
N
C) (129)
_mdmc =
8<: 2(1 m
d
mc)g(mdmc)
1 C
N
N 1

(N 2) mdmc

(2N 3)+C
2
 N 1
1 C
N

for t<tBmc
0 for ttBmc (130)
given the initial conditions
mdmc(0) = m
d(0) (131)
nmc(0) = n(0) (132)
Mmc(0) = z(0) N (133)
Here tBmc is the time when the m
d
mc reaches m
B, whereas z(0) is the initial
number of patents owned by each K-worker.
Let mdmc(t; N) be the solution to the di¤erential equation (130) subject to
the initial condition (131) for the given N . Then, using (132), we can solve
(129) for nmc(t; N), that satises the following relationship:
nmc(t; N) = n(0) + f
Z t
0
g(mdmc( ;N))  nmc( ;N)dg  (2 +
N   2
N
C)
Finally, solving (128) with initial condition (133), we obtain
Mmc(t; N) = fmc(t; N) N
where
fmc(t; N) = z(0) +  
Z t
0
nmc( ;N)  g(mdmc( ;N))d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This path yields the associated level of welfare:
Wmc(N) =
L


Z 1
0
e t ln[fmc(t; N) N ]d
Similarly, we dene the welfare generated by the md1 path as follows:
W1(N)  L


Z 1
0
e t ln[M1(t)]dt
where
_M1 =   n1  g(md1) N (134)
_n1 = n1  g(md1)  (2 + C) (135)
_md1 =

(1 md1)g(md1)f2(1 2md1) Cmd1g for t<tBmc
0 for ttBmc (136)
given the initial conditions
md1(0) = m
d(0) (137)
n1(0) = n(0) (138)
M1(0) = z(0) N (139)
Let md1(t) be the solution to the di¤erential equation (136) subject to the
initial condition (137). Then, using (138), we can solve (135) for n1(t). It
satises the following relationship:
n1(t) = n(0) + f
Z t
0
g(md1())  n1()dg  (2 + C)
that is independent of N . Finally, solving (134) with initial condition (137),
we obtain
M1(t; N) = f1(t) N
where
f1(t) = z(0) +  
Z t
0
n1()  g(md1())d
Notice that f1(t) is also independent of N . This path yields the associated
level of welfare:
W1(N) =
L


Z 1
0
e t ln[f1(t) N ]d
We can readily see that by construction,
lim
N!1
fmc(t; N) = f1(t) uniformly in t
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Therefore, taking the di¤erence of the welfare levels,
lim
N!1
fW1(N) Wmc(N)g = lim
N!1
fL


Z 1
0
e t ln[f1(t) N ]d
 L


Z 1
0
e t ln[fmc(t; N) N ]dg
=
L

lim
N!1
f
Z 1
0
e t ln[f1(t)]d +
Z 1
0
e t ln[N ]d
 
Z 1
0
e t ln[fmc(t; N)]d  
Z 1
0
e t ln[N ]dg
=
L

lim
N!1
f
Z 1
0
e t(ln[f1(t)]  ln[fmc(t; N)])dg
= 0
Finally, we can conclude our analysis as follows:
Lemma 5: As the number of knowledge workers N tends to innity, the
di¤erence in welfare corresponding to the myopic core path and the welfare
corresponding to the limiting myopic core path monotonically converges to 0.
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